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Some people are not tempted by lies now and then. They hold a worked-out view in which honesty itself is a mistake. On this view the world rewards the clever and punishes the naive, and the person who plays fair is simply the one who has not yet figured out the game. Families who hold this view sometimes teach it to their children on purpose, as a survival skill. It deserves a fair hearing, because people who hold it are not fools, and the best way to answer a view is to state it as well as its defenders would.

Thrasymachus and the tax collector

The argument is ancient. In the first book of Plato's Republic, written in the fourth century BC, a sharp-tongued teacher named Thrasymachus attacks the whole idea of justice. Thrasymachus argued that justice is simply the advantage of the stronger: rulers make rules that serve themselves and call obedience "justice." The honest citizen who obeys is not virtuous; he is being used.

Thrasymachus then makes the point that sounds most modern. In Benjamin Jowett's 1871 translation: "When there is an income tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of income; and when there is anything to be received the one gains nothing and the other much." In other words, the honest person pays more on the same income and collects less when the city hands out benefits. Honesty, on this account, is a tax on the naive, paid to the benefit of the cunning.

The ring of Gyges

In the second book, Plato's brother Glaucon presses the challenge further with a story. A shepherd in Lydia finds a magic ring. When he turns the ring, he becomes invisible, and he uses this power to seduce the queen, kill the king and seize the throne. Glaucon's question is simple: if anyone could act without being seen, would they really stay honest? He thinks not. People behave justly, he suggests, only because they fear getting caught.

Glaucon then poses the hardest version of the question. Compare a perfectly unjust man who has a reputation for justice with a perfectly just man who is thought unjust. The first enjoys honor, wealth and friends; the second is despised and punished. Who is better off? Unless the defender of honesty can show that the just man is better off even here, Glaucon says, honesty has not been defended. It has merely been recommended to people who are afraid.

Family first

The modern version of the argument often adds something Thrasymachus did not stress: love of family. It runs like this. My first duty is to my children. The state is distant, the system is rigged, and strangers would not lift a finger for my family. If a lie puts food on my table or gets my child a benefit, the lie is justified, because loyalty to my own comes before obligations to people who would never return the favor. Anyone who refuses to bend the truth for their family is not admirable; they are putting an abstraction ahead of the people who depend on them.

This argument has real force. Partiality toward family is not a moral failing. Almost every ethical tradition treats care for one's own as a genuine duty. The English philosopher Bernard Williams argued that a man who saves his drowning wife before a stranger should not need to calculate whether impartial morality permits it. And it is true that some institutions really are corrupt or predatory, and that people who trust them blindly can be exploited.

A study of amoral familism

In the 1950s the American political scientist Edward Banfield, working with his wife Laura Fasano Banfield, lived for months in a poor farming village in the south of Italy and wrote about it in The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, published in 1958. He gave the village a made-up name, Montegrano. Banfield called the outlook he found there amoral familism. In his summary, the people he observed acted as if following one rule: maximize the short-run material advantage of your own household, and assume that everyone else is doing the same.

Banfield traced the consequences. No one would work for a common project unless it paid off for their own family. Officials were assumed to be taking bribes, so no one trusted them, and anyone who held office was expected to profit from it. Laws were obeyed only where punishment was likely. The result, he argued, was a village unable to organize even simple shared improvements such as a school or a hospital, which kept it poor.

Banfield's study is a description of beliefs, not of a people. Similar outlooks have been described in rich and poor places, in cities and villages, in every part of the world, wherever people have learned to expect nothing from anyone outside the household. Anyone can come to hold them, and many people hold a milder version without ever naming it.

Older traditions of loyalty

The tension between family loyalty and honesty is old. In the Analects, a local ruler boasts to Confucius that the upright men of his region will testify if their father steals a sheep. Confucius disagrees. In Legge's translation, "The father conceals the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. Uprightness is to be found in this." Plato's dialogue Euthyphro shows the opposite case. Euthyphro is on his way to prosecute his own father for the death of a laborer, and Socrates questions whether he really knows what piety requires.

Notice what Confucius did and did not say. He defended a son's refusal to inform on his father. He did not defend lying to strangers for profit. Protecting family from the law and exploiting the public for family gain are different things, a distinction the next level will return to.

Worked example: the lesson at the kitchen table

Picture a parent explaining the world to a teenager. "Everybody cheats. The people at the top cheat the most and never get caught. If you play by the rules, you will pay full price for everything and get nothing back. The people who tell you to be honest are either suckers or hypocrites. Your loyalty is to this family. Out there, take what you can."

Lay out the argument in steps. First: institutions are unfair and often corrupt. Second: other people will cheat if they can. Third: therefore an honest person will be exploited. Fourth: family comes first. Conclusion: lying to outsiders for the family's benefit is not only allowed but wise.

The first two premises contain real truth. Some institutions are unfair. Some people do cheat. The fourth premise, that family deserves special care, is something nearly everyone accepts. That is what makes the argument persuasive. Whether the conclusion follows, and whether it actually serves the family it claims to protect, is a separate question, and it is the question the next level takes up.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What did Thrasymachus claim justice is?
2. What did Thrasymachus say about the just man and taxes?
3. What does the ring in Glaucon's story allow its wearer to do?
4. Which comparison did Glaucon pose as the hardest test?
5. What name did Banfield give the outlook he described?
6. In Banfield's summary, what rule did villagers act on?
7. What did Confucius say about a father who steals a sheep?
8. What is Euthyphro doing when Socrates meets him?

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