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Some moral theories begin with a simple question: what rules would people agree to live by? Others begin with relationships: what do I owe this particular creature, given how we are connected? Both families of theory have struggled with animals, and both have produced some of the most interesting recent work.

Morality as agreement

Contract theories picture morality as an agreement among those who will live under it. In the tradition that runs from Thomas Hobbes, people accept rules because each gains from the restraint of others. Animals cannot join such a bargain. Since animals cannot make or keep agreements, this view concludes that we have no direct duties to them. The British philosopher Peter Carruthers defended a version of this in The Animals Issue (1992). He held that duties concerning animals are indirect, arising from what humans care about, such as the feelings of animal lovers and the risk that cruelty spreads to people.

John Rawls, the most influential contract theorist of the twentieth century, took a gentler line. In A Theory of Justice (1971) he wrote that cruelty to animals is wrong, but he placed animals outside the scope of justice, which he limited to beings capable of a sense of justice. Our duties to them, he said, belong to another part of morality that his theory did not try to cover. Rawls admitted that this left important questions open, and he listed our relations to animals and the rest of nature among them.

Widening the contract

Critics replied that contract views which exclude animals also struggle with human babies and people with severe cognitive disabilities, who cannot bargain either. Some tried to repair the theory. Rawls had asked readers to choose principles behind a veil of ignorance, not knowing their sex, race or talents. The philosopher Mark Rowlands argued that the veil should hide even more: the parties should not know which species they will belong to. Rationality, after all, is a natural endowment no one earns, just like intelligence or health. Others drew on T. M. Scanlon's contractualism, which asks what principles no one could reasonably reject. Scanlon suggested that trustees could speak for beings who cannot speak for themselves, a role that could extend to animals.

Relationships and context

A second family of views says that what we owe animals depends partly on our relationship to them. Clare Palmer, in Animal Ethics in Context (2010), argued that we have special duties to domesticated animals because we made them dependent on us: we bred them, removed them from the wild and control their lives. To wild animals, by contrast, we generally owe only that we not harm them. Palmer called this a laissez-faire intuition and set out to defend it.

Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka turned the idea into political theory in Zoopolis (2011). They proposed three groups. Domesticated animals should count as co-citizens of a shared society, with a say, through human interpreters, in how it is run. Wild animals form sovereign communities that humans should generally leave to govern themselves. Liminal animals, such as city pigeons, rats and foxes, are denizens: residents who live among us without full citizenship, owed fair terms of coexistence but not full membership.

Care and fellow creatures

Feminist care ethicists such as Josephine Donovan and Carol Adams argued that rights and utility both leave out something essential. They emphasized attention to particular animals, and to emotions such as sympathy, not only abstract rules. Moral life, on this view, starts with noticing and responding to a creature in front of you.

The philosopher Cora Diamond made a related point in a 1978 essay, "Eating Meat and Eating People." She noticed that we do not eat our dead, even though the dead have no interests, and that we do not explain this by listing capacities. She argued that moral life rests on concepts such as "fellow creature," not on lists of capacities, and that the hope for change lies in extending such concepts to animals.

Worked example: three animals, three relationships

Consider a family's elderly dog, a fox that raids the bins on their city street, and a deer in a forest a hundred miles away. On Palmer's view, the family owes the dog care, food and medicine, because they and people like them made it dependent. They owe the fox and the deer, mainly, that they not harm them. Zoopolis gives a richer map: the dog is a fellow member of the household and the political community, the fox is a denizen whose presence must be tolerated on fair terms, and the deer belongs to a wild community whose territory deserves respect. A care ethicist would add that the family's grief when the dog dies is not a mistake to be corrected by theory, but part of what morality is about. A strict contract theorist would say the family owes the animals nothing directly, but must not upset neighbors who care about them. Laying the views side by side shows how much depends on where one begins.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. Why do Hobbes-style contract theories give us no direct duties to animals?
2. What did Carruthers say about duties concerning animals?
3. Where did Rawls place animals in A Theory of Justice?
4. How did Rowlands propose to widen Rawls's veil of ignorance?
5. What role did Scanlon suggest for those who cannot speak for themselves?
6. Why did Palmer say we owe special duties to domesticated animals?
7. In Zoopolis, what status do liminal animals such as city pigeons have?
8. What did Cora Diamond say moral life rests on?

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