Kant is usually cast as the villain of animal ethics. He held that only rational beings are ends in themselves, and that animals, lacking reason, may be used as means. Two of the most important recent books on animals take that legacy in opposite directions. One rebuilds Kant's argument from the inside; the other replaces it with an account of flourishing.
Korsgaard's Kantian argument
Christine Korsgaard, a leading Kantian philosopher at Harvard, argued in Fellow Creatures (2018) that Kant's own method supports duties to animals that Kant denied. Kant had held that only rational beings are ends in themselves. Korsgaard asks why we value ourselves in the first place. When we act, we treat our own ends as worth pursuing, and so treat ourselves as mattering. But what we value in ourselves is not only our reason. We value ourselves as creatures for whom things can be good or bad: we care whether we are fed, safe and free of pain. That is something we share with other animals. If we value it in ourselves, consistency requires us to value it in every being that has it.
Korsgaard keeps a distinction from Kant. Humans are ends in themselves in an active sense: we can make and follow moral laws, which is why we are moral agents. Animals are ends in themselves in a passive sense: each is a being whose own good matters for its sake, and whom moral laws must therefore protect. Animals cannot make the laws, but they fall under their protection.
Tethered value
A second argument targets the common claim that humans are simply more important than animals. Korsgaard holds that all value is value for some creature: things are good or bad for someone. She calls this tethered value. There is no standpoint from nowhere from which a human life could be ranked above a hawk's. A human's life is more important to the human; a hawk's life is more important to the hawk. So the question of which species matters more, asked in absolute terms, has no answer apart from someone's point of view. Korsgaard concludes that much of how people now use animals, including industrial farming and much experimentation, cannot be justified.
Nussbaum and flourishing
Martha Nussbaum of the University of Chicago approached animals through her capabilities approach, which asks what each being is able to do and be. Her book Justice for Animals (2023) begins with wonder at the variety of animal lives: the elephant's memory, the dolphin's play, the crow's ingenuity. Each animal, she argued, is a striving creature, and justice requires that it have a real chance to flourish in the way characteristic of its kind. That includes health and freedom from pain, but also movement, play, social bonds and some control over its surroundings.
Nussbaum criticized two rival views. The first, which she called the So Like Us approach, grants protection to animals in proportion to how much they resemble humans, favoring apes and dolphins. She rejected ranking animals by their likeness to human beings, since a bird's life is not a failed attempt at a human one. The second was utilitarianism. She argued that it looks too narrowly at pleasure and pain, so that a well-fed, pain-free animal kept in a bare pen might seem to have no complaint, and that summing up experiences across individuals loses sight of each animal's own life.
Critics press both views. Of Korsgaard, some ask whether tethered value proves too much: if no life is more important in absolute terms, how do we choose when a human life and an animal life conflict? Of Nussbaum, some ask who decides what flourishing is for a species, and whether her lists of capabilities simply express human tastes. Others note that both views imply duties, such as protecting animals from one another, that are hard to limit. The two thinkers also differ from each other. Korsgaard's argument still runs through what we value in ourselves, while Nussbaum starts from the animals and their forms of life, without routing the case through human self-regard.
Worked example: the orca in the tank
An orca lives in a marine park. It is well fed, receives good veterinary care, and shows no obvious signs of pain. A narrow pleasure and pain test might find little wrong. Korsgaard asks a different question: whose good is the park pursuing? The orca's life is a life for the orca, and its value is not exhausted by the visitors' enjoyment. Nussbaum asks what the orca can do. In the wild, orcas travel long distances each day, hunt cooperatively and live in family groups for life. In a tank those capabilities are largely blocked, however kind the keepers are. On both views the absence of pain does not settle the matter. Public opinion moved in a similar direction: in 2016 SeaWorld announced it would stop breeding orcas, and California banned the breeding of captive orcas that same year.
