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No theory in ethics has faced more objections than utilitarianism, and some of the sharpest have shaped moral philosophy itself. This level sets out the strongest of them, and the best replies.

The sheriff and the scapegoat

In 1957 the Australian philosopher H. J. McCloskey described a case that has been retold ever since. A town has suffered a terrible crime. Its people believe a certain man is guilty and threaten a riot in which many will die unless he is punished. The sheriff knows the man is innocent. In McCloskey's case, a sheriff can stop a deadly riot only by framing and punishing an innocent man, and nobody will ever learn the truth.

The point of the case is that utilitarianism seems to allow grave injustice to an individual whenever the totals favor it. Most people think framing the innocent man would be monstrous, whatever the numbers. If utilitarianism says otherwise, so much the worse for utilitarianism.

The utility monster

The American philosopher Robert Nozick offered a stranger case in 1974. Imagine a utility monster: a being that gains far more well-being from each resource than anyone else, so that maximizing would hand it nearly everything. Sum-ranking seems to say we should all be sacrificed to feed it. The case shows that maximizing a total pays no attention to how the total is shared out.

The separateness of persons

Both cases point to a deeper complaint. In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls argued that utilitarianism treats society as if it were one person, balancing gains and losses across different lives as one would within a single life. Within my own life, I may accept a painful operation now for health later; the pain and the benefit are both mine. But when we impose a loss on one person to give a gain to another, nobody receives compensation. The loser simply loses.

Nozick put the point bluntly. Nozick argued that there is no social entity that gains from a sacrifice, only individual people with their own lives. To sacrifice one for the sake of others, he held, fails to respect that the person sacrificed has the only life he has.

Demands without limit

A further objection holds that utilitarianism asks too much. If every hour and every spare dollar should go wherever it does the most good, there is little room left for one's own projects. In 1982 the American philosopher Samuel Scheffler proposed a middle path. Scheffler's agent-centered prerogative is a permission to give one's own projects and interests extra weight, so that a person need not always do the most good. Critics asked how much extra weight is allowed, and why.

Clueless about the future

A newer worry concerns knowledge. Every act ripples outward for centuries. A short delay on a road might change who meets whom, which children are born, and so the whole course of later history. In 2000 the British philosopher James Lenman argued that the long-run consequences of our acts are so vast and unknown that we cannot tell which act is best. This problem, often called cluelessness, threatens to leave consequentialism with no practical advice. Defenders reply that unknown effects are as likely to be good as bad, so they cancel out, but critics doubt that such symmetry can be assumed.

The replies

Utilitarians have answered in several ways. One reply is to accept the verdicts. Smart, for example, accepted hard verdicts and asked whether the opposing intuition was trustworthy. Intuitions formed for ordinary life may be unreliable in strange cases such as the utility monster, which no one has met.

Another reply follows Mill and Hare. A society whose officials frame innocent people, even rarely, would live in fear, and the secret would rarely stay secret. Firm rights against punishing the innocent produce far more happiness than any policy of exceptions. On this view, the objection mistakes an artificial case for a real one.

A third reply refines the theory. Prioritarians, for example, give extra weight to benefits for the worse off, which blunts the utility monster. But each refinement moves further from classical utilitarianism, and critics say this shows that equal worth needs protection that pure summing cannot supply.

Worked example: pressure to convict

After a series of attacks on women in a city, protests grow angry and the police are under intense pressure. Detectives have a suspect with a prior record, weak evidence and an alibi they doubt but cannot disprove. A senior officer argues that charging him now would calm the city, reassure women and restore trust in the police, while the man's past makes him unsympathetic.

A crude calculation might favor the charge. But McCloskey's case asks whether we would accept the reasoning if we were the suspect. Rawls asks who is compensated for his loss, and the answer is no one. Mill and Hare would add the long view: if police learn that convictions can be bent to public mood, the real attacker stays free, the justice system loses its legitimacy and every citizen becomes less secure. Here utilitarian reasoning, done carefully, lands on the same side as the rights it is accused of ignoring. The harder question is whether it would still do so in a case where secrecy really could be guaranteed.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What does McCloskey's sheriff case describe?
2. What is the sheriff case meant to show about utilitarianism?
3. What is Nozick's utility monster?
4. What did Rawls say utilitarianism does with society?
5. What did Nozick say about sacrifices made for society?
6. What is Scheffler's agent-centered prerogative?
7. What does the cluelessness problem claim?
8. How did Smart often respond to cases that clash with intuition?

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