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For more than two thousand years, logic meant Aristotle's syllogisms: patterns such as "all humans are mortal, all Greeks are humans, so all Greeks are mortal." The patterns were reliable, but they were narrow. In 1879 an obscure mathematics lecturer at the University of Jena, Gottlob Frege (1848 to 1925), published a slim book that changed this. Its title, Begriffsschrift, means "concept script." In it Frege offered a formal notation with quantifiers and variables, the core of the logic that philosophers, mathematicians and computer scientists use today.

Every and some

Why did logic need rebuilding? Consider the sentence "everyone admires someone." It might mean that each person admires somebody or other, perhaps a different person each time. Or it might mean that there is one person whom everybody admires. These are very different claims, yet the grammar hides the difference. Syllogistic logic struggled with sentences of multiple generality, which mix "every" and "some" in one claim, and mathematics is full of such sentences: for every number there is a larger one.

Frege's solution was to treat "every" and "some" as quantifiers that bind variables, and to make their order visible. In modern notation the first reading says: for every x there is some y such that x admires y. The second says: there is some y such that for every x, x admires y. Swapping the order changes the meaning, and the notation shows exactly how.

Numbers from logic

Frege built his logic for a purpose. He wanted to show that arithmetic can be derived from pure logic, a project now called logicism. If he succeeded, our knowledge of numbers would rest on the same secure ground as our knowledge that if p and q are both true, then p is true.

In The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884) he asked what a statement of number is about. When we say "Jupiter has four moons," what has the number four? Not any one moon, and not the pile of moons, which could be counted as many pieces of rock instead. Frege argued that the number is assigned to a concept, here "moon of Jupiter": the statement says that four things fall under that concept. Along the way he set out a rule that later philosophers treasured. In paraphrase: never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, only in the context of a sentence. Words get their meaning from the work they do in complete thoughts.

The letter

Frege spent a decade turning his program into a full system, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, in two volumes. In June 1902, as the second volume was going to press, he received a polite letter from a young Englishman, Bertrand Russell. Russell admired the work, and then pointed out that one of its basic laws allowed a contradiction to be derived. Frege's whole system was inconsistent.

Frege added an appendix acknowledging the problem. In substance, he wrote that hardly anything worse can happen to a scientific author than to see the foundation of a building give way just as the work is finished. The exchange has often been praised as a model of intellectual honesty on both sides: Russell wrote to the man rather than about him, and Frege put his own failure on the record.

Recognition, late and partial

In his lifetime Frege's work was mostly ignored, and few readers understood it. Russell's appendix on Frege in The Principles of Mathematics (1903) and the enthusiasm of the young Wittgenstein did much to make him known. Today he is widely regarded as the most important logician since Aristotle.

Honesty about the man requires one more note. A private diary Frege kept in 1924, published decades later, shows that in old age he held bitterly nationalist and antisemitic views. Brilliance in logic, it turns out, is no guarantee of moral clarity. The value of his logic does not depend on its author's character, but the diary is a reminder that clear thinking about arguments has to be joined to a steady regard for persons.

Worked example: every student read a book

A teacher announces, "Every student read a book over the summer." A parent hears this as good news about a reading program, imagining one assigned book that everyone finished. Another parent hears it as modest news: each student read at least one book of their own choosing. Who is right?

Frege's notation forces the teacher to choose. Either for every student x there is some book y such that x read y, or there is some book y such that for every student x, x read y. The second implies the first, but not the reverse. If the school wants to say the reading program worked, it needs the second reading, and it needs evidence for it. A great deal of confusion in reports, contracts and statistics comes from exactly this kind of hidden ambiguity, and the logic Frege invented in 1879 is still the cleanest way to bring it into the open.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What did Frege's Begriffsschrift (1879) introduce?
2. What kind of sentence did syllogistic logic handle poorly?
3. What is logicism?
4. On Frege's analysis, "Jupiter has four moons" assigns a number to what?
5. What does Frege's context principle advise?
6. When did Russell's letter reach Frege in 1902?
7. What did Russell's letter reveal about Frege's system?
8. How was Frege's work received during his lifetime?

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