Bertrand Russell (1872 to 1970) lived for ninety seven years and seemed to do several lifetimes of work. He helped found modern logic, wrote popular books on everything from marriage to the atom, went to prison twice for protest, and won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1950. His central philosophical idea was that the grammatical form of a sentence can mislead us about its logical form, and that much bad philosophy comes from trusting grammar.
The paradox
In 1901, while working on the foundations of mathematics, Russell found the problem that he would report to Frege. Some collections, or sets, seem to be members of themselves: the set of all things that are not teacups is not a teacup, so it belongs to itself. Most sets are not members of themselves: the set of teacups is not a teacup. Now consider the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. Is it a member of itself? If it is, then it is not, and if it is not, then it is. Either answer leads to its opposite.
A popular version imagines a village barber who shaves all and only the men who do not shave themselves. Who shaves the barber? The barber case has an easy answer: no such barber can exist. The set case is harder, because Frege's logic, and the ordinary idea of a set, seemed to guarantee that the set must exist.
Types and Principia
Russell's answer was the theory of types. On this theory sets are arranged in levels, so that a set can contain only things from lower levels. Individual things are at the bottom, sets of individuals one level up, sets of those sets above that, and so on. The question "is this set a member of itself?" is then not false but ill formed, like asking whether the number seven is green.
With Alfred North Whitehead, Russell then attempted the logicist project on a grand scale. Principia Mathematica, in three volumes (1910 to 1913), tried to derive mathematics from logic in exhaustive detail. It is famous for how long it takes: the groundwork needed to show that one plus one equals two arrives only after hundreds of pages.
A deeper blow came in 1931. The young Austrian logician Kurt Gödel proved that any consistent formal system rich enough for arithmetic leaves some truths unprovable within it. Mathematics could not be captured completely by any one set of rules. The dream of a finished logical foundation was over, though the logic built in pursuit of it became indispensable.
On denoting
Russell's most influential essay, "On Denoting" (1905), turned these tools on ordinary language. Consider the sentence "The present King of France is bald." France has no king. So is the sentence true? Surely not. Is it false? Then "the present King of France is not bald" should be true, and that seems wrong too. Some philosophers had concluded that the King of France must have some shadowy kind of being, so that we can talk about him.
Russell argued that the phrase "the present King of France" is not really a name at all. The sentence says three things at once: there is at least one King of France, there is at most one, and whoever he is, he is bald. Since the first part is false, on Russell's theory the whole sentence is simply false. No shadowy king is needed. The grammar suggested a subject being described; the logic revealed a hidden claim of existence.
Acquaintance and the value of questions
Russell also distinguished knowledge by acquaintance, of things we are directly aware of, from knowledge by description, of things we know only through true descriptions. You are acquainted with the color patch in front of you; you know Julius Caesar only as "the Roman general who crossed the Rubicon," and so on.
For all his rigor, Russell did not think philosophy's worth lay in final answers. He ended his short book The Problems of Philosophy (1912) by saying that philosophy is to be studied "not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions," but "for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible." The value of philosophy, for Russell, lay in questions that enlarge our sense of what is possible and loosen the dogmatic certainty that closes minds.
Worked example: seeing nobody
In Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking-Glass (1871), Alice reports, "I see nobody on the road." The King replies, "I only wish I had such eyes. To be able to see Nobody! And at that distance too!" The joke works because the King treats "nobody" as the name of a person, the way grammar invites.
Russell's analysis explains the joke. "I see nobody on the road" does not say that I see something called Nobody. It says that there is no person who is on the road and whom I see. The word "nobody" disappears into a quantifier. Whenever a phrase seems to name a mysterious object, Russell's lesson is to ask whether the sentence, properly analyzed, mentions any such object at all.
