In 1975 the Australian philosopher Peter Singer published Animal Liberation, a book that did more than any other to turn concern for animals into a mass movement. Its argument is short and hard to escape, which is why it remains the starting point for most debates. Singer revised it as Animal Liberation Now in 2023, keeping the core intact.
Equal consideration of interests
Singer's central idea is the principle of equal consideration of interests. It says that when we decide what to do, we should give equal weight to equal interests, no matter whose they are. A pain is a pain. If my headache and yours are equally bad, there is no reason to count mine twice. Singer's claim is that the same holds across species: if a pig's suffering is as intense as a human's, it deserves the same weight.
This is not a demand that everyone be treated the same. Equal consideration can require different treatment, because different beings have different interests. Singer pointed out that a pig has no interest in voting, so a right to vote would mean nothing to it. A pig does have a strong interest in not being confined so tightly it cannot turn around. The principle tells us to weigh the interests a being actually has.
Sentience as the boundary
Which beings have interests at all? Singer's answer is sentience, the capacity to have experiences that feel good or bad. A being that cannot suffer or enjoy anything has no interests to consider. His example was a stone: kicking it along a road does not harm it, because nothing can go better or worse for a stone. A mouse is different. Its life can go well or badly from its own point of view, so it has at least an interest in not suffering.
Singer called the refusal to extend equal consideration across the species line speciesism. He compared it to racism and sexism: in each case people favor the interests of their own group for no morally relevant reason. A racist gives more weight to the pain of people of his own race; a speciesist gives more weight to the pain of his own species. Neither difference, Singer argued, tells you anything about how much a pain hurts.
The argument from species overlap
The obvious reply is that humans differ from animals in morally relevant ways: we reason, use language, make plans and keep promises. Singer and others answered with an argument long called the argument from marginal cases. Some human beings, such as newborn infants and people with profound cognitive disabilities, have these abilities to a lesser degree than some animals, yet we rightly refuse to use them as food or in painful experiments. If so, those abilities cannot be what justifies treating animals worse. Many philosophers now prefer the name argument from species overlap, because the older label was felt to demean the humans it described.
Criticisms
The argument has drawn serious objections. The philosophers Eva Feder Kittay and Licia Carlson, writing with close knowledge of disability, argued that it uses disabled people as test cases while misdescribing their lives and relationships. Others say that belonging to the human community is itself morally relevant, much as being someone's child is, so species is not like race after all. Still others doubt that pains can be compared across species: we can hardly measure how much a fish suffers. Singer replies that rough comparisons are better than none, and that where the stakes for animals are huge and the human interest is small, no fine measurement is needed. A further worry is practical. Applied strictly, equal consideration would demand large changes in diet, research and land use, and some critics see this as a reason to doubt the principle. Singer treats it instead as a measure of how far current practice falls short.
Worked example: the slap and the horse
Singer offered a simple case to show what equal consideration does and does not mean. A hard slap with an open hand on the rump of a horse may cause it little pain, because of its thick skin. The same slap on a baby causes real pain. Equal consideration does not say the two acts are alike. It says that pains of the same intensity count the same, whoever feels them. So the slap on the baby is worse, because it hurts more. But there is some heavier blow that would hurt the horse as much, and that blow would be just as bad.
Now apply the principle to an everyday choice. Suppose someone prefers the taste of meat from an animal raised in a crowded shed to that of a plant meal. On one side is a modest interest in flavor. On the other is the animal's interest in avoiding months of confinement and pain. Singer argued that once the interests are weighed honestly, without counting the human's interests extra simply because they are human, the balance is clear. Critics accept the method but dispute the weights: how much the animal suffers, and how much the meal matters, are themselves contested. Either way, the dispute has become one about evidence and reasons, not about whose side you are on.
