A dog yelps when its paw is caught in a gate, and almost everyone winces. Most people feel that something bad has happened to the dog itself, not just to its owner. Animal ethics starts from that reaction and asks what follows from it. Which creatures matter morally, how much do they matter, and what do we owe them?
Moral status
Philosophers say a being has moral status when it matters morally for its own sake, so that it can be wronged and not merely damaged. A chair has no moral status: smashing it may wrong the person who owns it, but not the chair. A helpful distinction separates agents from patients. A moral agent is a being that can be held responsible for what it does, because it can grasp reasons and choose among them. A moral patient is any being that can be wronged. Every agent is also a patient, but not every patient is an agent. A human baby is a patient and not yet an agent, and on most views so is a dog or a cow.
A second distinction matters just as much. We have a direct duty to a being when we owe the duty to that being itself. We have an indirect duty when the duty concerns one thing but is really owed to someone else. If I promise you I will water your plants, my duty concerns the plants but is owed to you. For most of the history of Western philosophy, the leading view was that all our duties concerning animals are of this indirect kind.
Three classic answers
Aristotle, writing in the fourth century BCE, pictured nature as an order in which lower things serve higher ones. In his Politics he argued that plants exist for the sake of animals, and animals exist for the sake of human beings, who use them for food, clothing and tools. On this picture, using animals needs no special defense, since that is what they are for.
In 1637 René Descartes went further. In his Discourse on Method he argued that animals are a kind of natural machine. Lacking true language, he said, they lack reason, and many of his followers drew the stronger conclusion that animals have no minds and feel nothing at all. On that view a dog's cry is no more a sign of pain than the creak of a spring. Descartes himself was more cautious in some letters, and scholars still argue about what he meant, but the machine picture shaped how many scientists of the following century treated animals.
Immanuel Kant, lecturing on ethics in the 1780s, took a middle path. He held that animals lack the rational self-awareness that makes humans ends in themselves, so we have no direct duties to them. Yet he condemned cruelty, because a person who is cruel to animals tends to become cruel to people. Our duties concerning animals, on this view, are really duties to humanity, including to our own character.
A different question
In 1789 the English reformer Jeremy Bentham changed the question. In a footnote to his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, he argued that what matters is not whether a creature can reason or talk but whether it can suffer. He tied the point to the struggle against slavery, noting that the French had already seen that "the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor." He went on: "The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny."
Law soon began to move. In 1822 the British Parliament passed Martin's Act, named for the Irish politician Richard Martin, which made cruelty to cattle, horses and sheep a crime. It is often counted among the first national laws against animal cruelty. Two years later a group of reformers in London founded the society that became the RSPCA. Later in the century the writer Henry Salt, in Animals' Rights (1892), argued that animals, like humans, have a claim to a restricted freedom to live their own lives.
Worked example: the unseen kick
A man walking home alone kicks a stray dog that has no owner. Nobody sees, and he forgets it by morning. Was anything wrong? On Aristotle's picture the dog is a lesser being, though Aristotle might fault the man for a lack of self-control. On the machine view, the dog felt nothing, so nothing happened that matters. On Kant's view the act is wrong, but only because it coarsens the man and makes him likelier to mistreat people. On Bentham's view it is wrong because the dog was hurt.
Now change the case. Suppose the man takes a pill that guarantees the kick will leave his character untouched. Kant's explanation no longer finds anything to object to, yet most people think the kick is just as wrong. That reaction is evidence, though not proof, that the wrong is done to the dog, and that our duty here is direct. Much of the modern debate starts from this point and asks how far it reaches.
