The first of Peirce's popular articles, "The Fixation of Belief" (1877), asked a question most philosophy had skipped. Not "what is knowledge?" but "how do people actually settle their opinions, and which way of settling them works?" His answer gave pragmatism its theory of inquiry.
The irritation of doubt
Peirce began with a contrast. Belief is a calm and satisfactory state, a habit that guides action. Doubt is uneasy. It stops us and pushes us to find our way back to belief. In his words, "The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief. I shall term this struggle Inquiry."
Two consequences follow. First, real inquiry starts from genuine doubt, not doubt we merely pretend to have. Peirce mocked the method of René Descartes, who proposed to doubt everything at once. You cannot simply decide to doubt what you in fact believe, Peirce said; doubt needs a real reason, such as a surprise or a conflict between beliefs. Second, the aim of inquiry, as people actually pursue it, is to settle opinion. The question is which way of settling it will hold.
Four methods
Peirce described four methods. The first is tenacity: clinging to whatever you already believe and avoiding anything that might shake it. He compared it to the ostrich burying its head. It can bring comfort for a while, but it breaks down as soon as you meet other people who believe differently and seem just as sensible as you.
The second is authority: letting an institution, such as a state or church, decide what people must believe. Peirce granted that this method had built impressive civilizations and kept masses of people in calm agreement for centuries, often by persecuting dissenters. But no authority can regulate every opinion, and sooner or later some people notice that other countries and eras believed differently.
The third Peirce called the a priori method: adopting whatever seems "agreeable to reason," the views that feel natural after free conversation. Its weakness is that it makes belief a matter of taste, and tastes shift like fashions.
The fourth is the method of science. Its key feature is that it lets belief be settled by something outside us, real things that our thinking does not change, so that anyone who investigates long enough, starting from anywhere, should be led toward the same conclusion. Only this method, Peirce argued, has a built-in way to correct its own mistakes.
Truth as the end of inquiry
This led Peirce to his famous account of truth, in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear": "The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real." Truth, on this view, is not a reward handed out today. It is the point inquiry would reach if pursued far enough by a community of honest investigators.
Critics ask what happens to truths about things no inquiry could ever settle, such as how many hairs were on Caesar's head on the day he crossed the Rubicon. Peirce's defenders reply that he meant a hope that guides inquiry, not a guarantee that every question will be answered.
Fallibilism and abduction
Peirce's picture made fallibilism, the view that any of our beliefs might turn out to be mistaken, central to pragmatism. Fallibilism is not skepticism. We can have good reason for a belief and still hold it open to correction. Peirce urged one rule above all: never block the road of inquiry, for example by declaring a question closed forever or a mystery beyond explanation.
He also named a kind of reasoning that textbooks of his day ignored. Besides deduction and induction there is abduction: reasoning from a surprising fact to a hypothesis that would explain it. If the lawn is wet and the sky is clear, you may guess the sprinkler ran overnight. Abduction does not prove anything, but it is how new ideas enter inquiry, to be tested afterward by deduction and induction.
Worked example: a rumor about the water
A message spreads in a town claiming the tap water has been contaminated by a new factory. Watch Peirce's four methods at work. Some residents settle the question by tenacity: they already distrust the factory, so they believe the message and ignore anything else. Others rely on authority: the mayor has said the water is fine, so it is. A third group reasons a priori: it just seems likely that a big factory would pollute.
A fourth group does what Peirce recommended. They notice a surprising fact, perhaps a strange taste reported by several households, and form a hypothesis by abduction: something entered the supply. Then they deduce what would follow if that were true, such as raised levels of a certain chemical near the factory but not upstream, and they test. They publish the samples so anyone can check them. Whatever they find, their conclusion can be challenged and corrected by others, which is exactly what the other three methods cannot offer.
