How do we meet other minds?
You see a friend's face fall when a message arrives, and you know at once that something is wrong. How is that possible? You cannot feel their feelings from the inside. A long tradition said that we reason our way there: I notice that others behave as I do when I am sad, so I infer that they are sad too. Phenomenologists found this account false to experience. You do not see a face, then calculate. You see sadness in the face. The person who did most to clarify this was Edith Stein.
Edith Stein on empathy
Stein (1891 to 1942) was born into a Jewish family in Breslau, studied with Husserl in Göttingen and followed him to Freiburg, where in 1916 she completed a doctorate on empathy. It appeared in 1917 as On the Problem of Empathy. For Stein, empathy (Einfühlung) is a direct experience of another person's experience as theirs. It is its own kind of act, not an inference, not imitation and not being swept up in a crowd's mood.
Her key distinction is between experiences lived originally and experiences given non-originally. When I see my friend's grief, the grief is given to me, really and directly, but it is not lived by me. It is given to me, but lived originally by someone else. Stein compared this to memory: when I remember a past joy, the joy is present to me now, yet I am not now joyful. Empathy has a similar double structure, except that the original experience belongs to another person.
This put her at odds with Theodor Lipps, the leading theorist of empathy at the time, who described it as a kind of inner imitation in which the observer's self merges with the observed. Stein rejected the idea that empathy fuses or merges two selves. In empathy, she argued, the other remains other; that is what makes it knowledge of someone else rather than a feeling of my own. She also drew a consequence about self-knowledge: through empathy I can see myself as others see me, as one person among others, and so understand myself better.
A life shaped by exclusion
Stein worked as Husserl's assistant from 1916 to 1918, turning his piles of shorthand notes into usable drafts. Yet German universities would not let her qualify as a professor because she was a woman. She protested to the Prussian education ministry, which in 1920 declared that sex should not bar anyone from the qualification, but she was still turned away. She converted to Catholicism in 1922, taught at a teacher training college and later in Münster, and lost that post under the Nazi laws against Jews in 1933. That year she entered a Carmelite convent, taking the name Teresa Benedicta of the Cross. Moved to the Netherlands for safety, she was arrested in 1942 and murdered at Auschwitz in August 1942, together with her sister Rosa. The Catholic Church canonized her in 1998.
Husserl's lifeworld
Husserl's own last years were also darkened. Born Jewish, though baptized a Lutheran in 1886, he was barred from the University of Freiburg under the Nazi laws and could publish only abroad. In his final work, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, parts of which appeared in 1936, he introduced the idea of the lifeworld. The lifeworld is the everyday world of lived experience that the sciences presuppose: the world of warm and cold, near and far, morning and evening, in which scientists themselves live, measure and talk.
Husserl told the story of Galileo, who mathematized nature and forgot the lifeworld it grew from. Galileo's achievement was real, but his successors came to treat the idealized formulas as the true world and lived experience as mere appearance. Husserl was not against science. He argued that science is a human achievement built on the lifeworld, and that a science which forgets this cannot answer the questions that matter most to people, questions of meaning and of how to live. In the 1930s, as Europe slid into barbarism, that charge carried weight.
Husserl died in Freiburg in April 1938. Weeks later a young Franciscan priest, Herman Van Breda, smuggled his manuscripts to Leuven in Belgium: about 40,000 pages, mostly in an old German shorthand. The Husserl Archives he founded there still publish them.
Worked example: bad news at work
A colleague reads an email and goes quiet. Their shoulders drop and they stare at the screen. On Stein's account you do not first register a posture and then reason toward a hypothesis. You see distress, directly, in the way they sit. The distress is given to you, but you are not distressed in the same way; it is theirs. You might then feel sympathy, which is a further act directed at them, or you might feel nothing much. Empathy, for Stein, is the seeing, not the caring that may follow.
She also leaves room for error. Perhaps your colleague is merely concentrating. Empathy can be mistaken and corrected, as perception can, by looking again or by asking. And there is a moral lesson here that she would live out: what is given in empathy is a person, not an object, a subject with a perspective of their own.
