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The natural attitude

In daily life nobody wonders whether the street outside is real. We take for granted that the world exists, that it was here before us and will go on after us, and we get on with our business inside it. Husserl called this the natural attitude: taking the world's existence for granted. There is nothing wrong with it. Science also works within it, studying things that it assumes are simply there. But Husserl thought that this assumption hides something worth seeing: how the world comes to be given to us as a meaningful world in the first place. In Ideas I (1913) he proposed a method for bringing that into view.

The epoché

The method is called the epoché, an ancient Greek term the skeptics used for suspending judgment. Husserl's version means suspending, or bracketing, our belief in the world's existence so that we can study how things are given. The comparison is with brackets in algebra: what sits inside them is still there, but it is set aside while we work on something else. The epoché does not make the world vanish. It turns the world into a phenomenon, something to be described as it appears.

Husserl insisted that this is not Descartes's method of doubt. Descartes tried to doubt everything that could possibly be false. Husserl's bracketing sets the world's existence aside without denying or doubting it. The question is no longer "is this tree really there?" but "how does this tree show up as really there for me?" The bracketed tree loses nothing of its color, its height or its seeming reality; we simply stop using our belief in it as a premise.

Act and object

Once the world is bracketed, every experience can be studied from two sides. On one side is the act: perceiving, remembering, imagining, judging. Husserl called this the noesis. On the other side is the object exactly as that act presents it, which he called the noema. The noema is the object just as it is meant or experienced: the tree as seen from here, blossoming, partly hidden by a wall. Husserl offered a striking illustration in Ideas I. The real tree in the garden can burn down, but the tree as perceived, the meaning "this blossoming tree", cannot burn. It has no chemical properties at all.

Finding essences by imagining

Phenomenology seeks general structures, so it needs a way to tell what is essential to a kind of experience. Husserl's tool was free imaginative variation. You take an example and vary it in imagination to find which features cannot change without its ceasing to be that kind of thing. A melody can be played faster, on a different instrument or in another key and remain the same melody. Change the order of the notes and it becomes a different tune. What survives every variation is the essence, which Husserl called the eidos.

The thickness of the present

Husserl's most admired analysis concerns time. In lectures given in 1905, prepared for print by his assistant Edith Stein and published in 1928 with Heidegger named as editor, he asked how we hear a melody rather than a string of separate notes. If consciousness held only the present instant, the melody would never appear as a whole. Husserl answered that the lived present has thickness. Each moment includes a primal impression of the note now sounding, a retention that holds the note just past as part of the present experience, and a protention that anticipates the notes about to come. Retention is not memory. To recollect yesterday's concert is a new act that calls up something gone. Retention is the still living edge of what has just happened, the way the previous word of this sentence is still with you as you read this one.

Dissent in Göttingen

As Husserl developed the method he moved toward transcendental idealism, describing consciousness as the source that "constitutes" the meaning of everything that appears. Many of his early students, among them Reinach, Ingarden, Hedwig Conrad-Martius and Stein, saw this as a slide into idealism that cut phenomenology off from the real world, and they refused to follow. Later critics asked whether a full bracketing is even possible, since the describer always stands inside a body, a language and a history. Merleau-Ponty would argue that the reduction's chief lesson is that it can never be completed.

Worked example: a song on the radio

A familiar song comes on while you are cooking. In the natural attitude you hum along and stir the pot. Now bracket the questions of where the sound comes from and whether the radio really exists, and attend only to how the song is given. The chorus arrives before it sounds: protention has you ready for it, and a wrong note would jar precisely because it breaks an expectation. The line just sung lingers in retention, so you hear the phrase as a phrase. If the station cuts out mid-line, you feel the gap at once, because a melody is lived as a whole stretched across time.

Now vary the example. Sung by a different voice, slowed down, played on a piano: still the same song. Shuffle its notes and it is gone. Free variation has picked out part of what makes this melody what it is.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What did Husserl mean by the natural attitude?
2. What is the epoché in Husserl's method?
3. How does Husserl's bracketing differ from Descartes's method of doubt?
4. What is the noema, in Husserl's terms?
5. What is the purpose of free imaginative variation?
6. In Husserl's account of time, what is retention?
7. In Husserl's account of time, what is protention?
8. Why did many of Husserl's early Göttingen students refuse to follow his later work?

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