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Persons as ends

Kant offered other formulations of the categorical imperative, and one of them has shaped the modern language of rights more than any other. It tells us to treat humanity, in ourselves and in others, always as an end and never merely as a means.

We use one another as means all the time, and rightly. When you hire a plumber, you use them as a means, but not merely as one: they agree to the deal for their own reasons, and you respect their choice. What is forbidden is treating a person as a mere tool, one whose own ends and consent do not count. Deception and coercion are the clearest cases, because they bypass the other person's reason.

Price and dignity

Kant drew a sharp line between two kinds of value. Whatever has a price can be replaced by something else of equal value; it can be traded. What has dignity is above all price and admits of no equivalent. Things have a price. Persons, as rational beings capable of giving themselves the moral law, have dignity. That is why a person's life cannot be balanced against a sum of money, or even simply against other lives, as if people were interchangeable units.

Kant pictured an ideal community of such beings, which he called the kingdom of ends: a union of rational beings under laws they give themselves, each both a lawmaker and a member. It is a standard, not a place.

The hardest case: the lie

Kant's ethics is also famous for a case where many readers think it goes wrong. The French writer Benjamin Constant objected that a strict duty of truthfulness would forbid lying even to a murderer who asks where your friend is hiding. Kant replied in a short essay of 1797, and bit the bullet: even then, truthfulness is a strict duty. A lie, he argued, damages the trust on which all agreements rest, and you become responsible for its consequences.

Most later Kantians have tried to soften this. Some argue that a murderer who uses your honesty for murder has forfeited a claim on it; others separate the ethics of inner virtue from the law.

Right: freedom under law

In the Metaphysics of Morals (1797) Kant turned from inner virtue to outward law, which he called right. Its principle is that each person's freedom must be able to coexist with everyone else's under a universal law. Kant said there is only one innate right, belonging to everyone simply as human: freedom, meaning independence from another's choice. A legitimate state exists to secure that freedom, which is why Kant thought we have a duty to leave a lawless condition and join a civil one.

Kant was not a revolutionary. He denied that subjects have a right of rebellion and argued for reform from above, through publicity and the freedom of the pen. Yet he praised the enthusiasm that distant spectators of the French Revolution felt for it as a sign of moral progress in the human race.

Peace as a task

Kant's essay Toward Perpetual Peace (1795) is shaped like a treaty. Its preliminary articles name practices that make peace impossible. No peace treaty may secretly reserve material for a future war; standing armies should in time be abolished; states should not run up debts to fund wars; no state should forcibly interfere in another's constitution; and no state at war should use methods, such as assassins or poisoners, that would destroy the trust a later peace requires. Kant explicitly rejected a single world state, which he feared would become a soulless despotism.

He was realistic about human nature. Even a nation of devils, if they had understanding, could solve the problem of founding a state: well designed institutions can make selfish people behave as if they were good. In an earlier essay he had argued that our "unsocial sociability," the need for others combined with the wish to get our own way, drives humanity toward better laws in spite of itself.

Worked example: the hijacked plane

After the attacks of 11 September 2001, Germany passed a law in 2005 allowing its air force, as a last resort, to shoot down a passenger plane that terrorists intended to use as a weapon. The reasoning: the passengers would die anyway, and many more lives on the ground could be saved.

In February 2006 the Federal Constitutional Court struck down that provision. Germany's postwar Basic Law opens by declaring human dignity inviolable, and the court held that killing innocent passengers in order to save others would treat them as mere objects of state action, denying them the value they possess for their own sake.

The ruling is close to Kant's distinction between price and dignity. Innocent passengers are not a smaller number to be subtracted from a larger one. Critics argued that the court's position could cost thousands of lives on the ground, a utilitarian worry Kant's ethics must face squarely. But the case shows how an idea from a Königsberg study of the 1780s now shapes constitutional law: some things may not be done to a person, whatever the sum says.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. Why does hiring a plumber not break Kant's humanity formula?
2. What has dignity rather than a price, in Kant's view?
3. What is Kant's kingdom of ends?
4. Whose objection about lying to a murderer did Kant answer in 1797?
5. What did Kant say about lying to a murderer seeking your friend?
6. What did Kant name as the one innate right?
7. Which is one of the preliminary articles of Toward Perpetual Peace?
8. What did Kant say even a nation of devils could solve?

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