The good will
In 1785 Kant published a short, dense book, the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. It opens, in T. K. Abbott's translation, with a famous sentence: "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will." Intelligence, courage, wealth, even happiness can be put to bad use. A good will, whatever it achieves, is good in itself. Even if it achieved nothing, Kant wrote, it would shine like a jewel by its own light.
Moral worth lies in the principle a person acts on, not in outcomes that depend partly on chance.
Maxims and duty
Kant described action in terms of maxims. A maxim is the personal rule or policy behind an action: "when I need money, I will borrow it and promise to repay."
Kant also distinguished acting in accordance with duty from acting from duty. A shopkeeper who never cheats children may be honest only because cheating would hurt his trade. His conduct is right, but it does not show a good will, since it would change the moment cheating paid. Moral worth belongs to doing the right thing because it is right.
Two kinds of ought
Most commands we give ourselves are conditional. "If you want to pass the exam, study." This is a hypothetical imperative: an ought that binds only those who have a certain goal. Moral commands are different. "Do not betray your friends" does not depend on whether betrayal suits your plans. Kant called such a command categorical, and he held that all moral duties rest on one supreme categorical imperative.
The test of universal law
Its best known formulation says: act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will to become a universal law.
Kant's tests come in two strengths. Some maxims fail outright, because the universalized maxim undermines itself. If everyone made false promises whenever convenient, no one would accept a promise, and the very practice the false promiser relies on would vanish. Such a maxim cannot even be conceived as a universal law, and the duty it violates is a perfect duty: strict, owed without exception.
Other maxims pass the first test but fail the second. A world in which no one ever helped anyone could exist without contradiction. But no one could will it, since every person sometimes needs help and wants it. Kant said such a maxim can be conceived as universal but not willed. The duty it violates is an imperfect duty, like the duty to help others or to develop one's talents. Imperfect duties leave latitude over how and when to fulfil them: you must make others' good one of your ends, but you choose which people to help and in what ways.
Autonomy
Where does the moral law come from? Not from God's command, the state, tradition or our desires. Each of these would make morality a matter of obeying something outside reason, which Kant called heteronomy. The moral law comes from the will itself. Autonomy means giving the moral law to oneself through reason. This is why Kant thought freedom and morality are bound together: to be free is not to do whatever one likes, which is to be pushed around by impulses, but to act on principles one can recognize as one's own and everyone's.
In 1788, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant summed up his outlook in a famous sentence. In Abbott's version: "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above and the moral law within."
Not everyone was charmed. The poet Friedrich Schiller mocked the strictness of the doctrine in a short verse of 1796: he gladly helps his friends, he says, but sadly does it with inclination, so he worries he is not virtuous. Kant's defenders reply that he never asked people to lack feeling, and later urged them to cultivate sympathy.
Worked example: the friendly fake review
Dana's friend has opened a small café, and business is slow. The friend asks Dana to post five-star reviews of dishes she has never tasted. Dana is tempted: it seems kind, and who would it hurt?
Kant would ask Dana to state her maxim honestly: "When a friend's business is struggling, I will post reviews of meals I never ate." Now universalize it. If everyone posted invented reviews for friends, reviews would carry no information, readers would ignore them, and the practice Dana means to exploit would collapse. The maxim cannot be conceived as a universal law. Like the false promise, it violates a perfect duty.
It does not forbid helping her friend. Kant would add that Dana has an imperfect duty of beneficence, and she has wide latitude in fulfilling it: she could eat there and write an honest review, bring colleagues, or help redesign the menu. And if Dana chooses honesty only because she fears being caught, she acts in accordance with duty; if she chooses it because deceiving strangers is wrong, her choice shows a good will.
