For much of Western history, the most demanding answer to the question "Is lying ever allowed?" was simply no. Three thinkers stand behind that answer: Augustine in the late Roman world, Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, and Immanuel Kant at the end of the eighteenth. Their position strikes many modern readers as too strict. It is worth understanding why serious people held it, because their reasons still carry force even for those who allow exceptions.
Augustine's hard line
Augustine's argument starts from what speech is for. Words were given to people so that they could make their thoughts known to one another, and using them to plant false thoughts turns them against their purpose. A lie is not just a bad act that happens to involve words. It corrupts the very tool that makes human fellowship possible.
His second argument concerned the liar's own soul. Augustine cited a line from the Book of Wisdom, "the mouth that belieth slayeth the soul," and took it seriously. A lie might save a body, but it damaged something he considered more valuable. This led him to his most famous and most disputed conclusion: a person should not lie even to save another person's life. Bodily life, he reasoned, ends anyway, while the integrity of the soul matters forever. He did not think that anyone was obliged to betray the innocent. He thought there was usually a third path between lying and betrayal, such as silence, refusal or courage.
Augustine was not naive about degrees of wrong. He sorted lies into eight kinds, ranking as gravest the lie told in teaching religion and as least serious the lie that harms no one and protects someone from harm. All eight were wrong, but some were far worse than others. A teacher who lied about the faith could mislead thousands for generations; a person who lied to hide a frightened child did something wrong, he thought, but understandable.
Aquinas sorts the lies
Thomas Aquinas, writing his Summa Theologiae in the 1260s and 1270s, kept Augustine's strictness but simplified the scheme. Aquinas named three kinds of lie: the officious lie, told to help someone; the jocose lie, told in fun; and the mischievous lie, told to do harm. In Aquinas's day "officious" meant helpful or dutiful, which is why a lie to protect a friend fell under that heading.
All three were sins, because all three set the tongue against the mind. But Aquinas drew a sharp line between them. Only the mischievous lie, which aims at injury, counted as a mortal sin; helpful lies and joking lies were lesser, venial faults. This is already a large step toward common sense. It acknowledges that the person who lies to spare a friend's feelings is not in the same moral position as the con artist.
Aquinas also made a distinction that would matter enormously later. Lying, he held, is always wrong, but it is permitted to hide the truth prudently, for example by keeping silent. You do not owe every questioner every fact. You owe them not to plant a falsehood. The space between "telling everything" and "telling a lie" is wide, and a thoughtful person can often find an honest path through it.
Clever escapes and their critics
Later moral writers, especially some sixteenth and seventeenth century casuists, pushed this space too far. They developed the doctrine of mental reservation, which allowed a speaker to say something misleading aloud while silently adding a qualification in his own mind. Asked "Did you see the fugitive?", one could answer "No" while silently adding "not in the last hour." The French mathematician and writer Blaise Pascal found this absurd. In his Provincial Letters of 1656 to 1657, Pascal ridiculed mental reservation as a way of lying while pretending not to. His satire was so effective that the phrase still suggests slippery evasion.
Pascal's point is worth keeping. A rule against lying is only as good as the honesty with which it is applied. If the rule can be dodged by private word games, it protects nothing.
Kant: what the liar does to himself
Immanuel Kant is best known for his claim that a lying promise fails the test of being willed as a universal law. Less often discussed is what he said in his Doctrine of Virtue, published in 1797. There Kant treated lying as the gravest violation of a person's duty to himself, not only a wrong to the person deceived. The liar, he argued, throws away his own dignity as a human being. A being with the power of speech has the capacity to share its thoughts. By lying, it makes itself a mere imitation of a person, an outward show with nothing true behind it.
This is a striking idea, and a modern one in its way. It says that the first victim of a lie is the liar. Each lie makes it a little harder for the liar to be someone whose words mean anything, even to himself.
What the strict view gets right
Most people today reject the claim that one must never lie under any circumstances. Yet the strict thinkers saw several things clearly. They saw that lying damages the liar's character. They saw that the line between lying and not telling everything is real and important. And they saw that the person tempted to lie almost always has more choices than the moment seems to allow.
Worked example: the bishop who would not lie
Augustine told a story to show that the third path he described was real. A bishop named Firmus, from Augustine's own home town of Tagaste in North Africa, was hiding a man whom imperial officers were hunting. The officers came and demanded to know where the man was. Firmus answered that he could neither lie nor betray a man. He would not tell them, and he would not deny that he knew.
The officers tortured him. Firmus held to his answer. According to Augustine, the emperor was so impressed by the bishop's steadfastness that he pardoned the fugitive.
The story has an obvious weakness: not every emperor pardons, and not every refusal ends well. Critics of the strict view point out that a refusal can tell a murderer exactly what he wants to know. But the story shows what the strict view asks of people. It does not ask them to hand over the innocent. It asks them to protect the innocent without becoming liars, and to accept a personal cost for doing so. Whether or not one agrees, it is a picture of integrity under pressure: the refusal to let a threat decide what kind of person you will be.
