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In November 1971, as millions of refugees fled war and hunger in East Bengal into India, a young Australian philosopher named Peter Singer sat down to write an essay. "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" appeared in the journal Philosophy and Public Affairs the following year. Few short essays in modern philosophy have been argued over more.

The pond

Singer asked readers to picture themselves walking past a shallow pond and seeing a small child drowning in it. You could wade in and pull the child out. You would ruin your clothes, but nothing worse. Almost everyone agrees that you must wade in, and that walking on would be monstrous.

From this case Singer drew a general principle. In paraphrase: if we can prevent something very bad from happening without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought to do it.

The trouble, Singer pointed out, is that the principle does not stop at the water's edge. Children die every day from hunger and preventable disease, and people in rich countries could help them through aid agencies at modest cost. If the principle is true, then giving money to save those children is not a pleasant extra. It is something we must do.

Distance and numbers

Two replies come to mind at once. The first is that the child in the pond is in front of you, while the hungry child is thousands of miles away. Singer answered that physical distance makes no moral difference in itself. Distance can affect what you know and whether your help can arrive, but fast communication and working relief agencies have shrunk those practical gaps.

The second reply is that millions of other people could help the distant child, while you may be the only person at the pond. Singer changed the story. Suppose several other adults are standing around the pond, also doing nothing. Does their idleness make it acceptable for you to walk on? Most people say no. The fact that others could help but do not, Singer argued, does not reduce your own obligation.

Charity and duty

The most radical part of the essay concerns the line between duty and charity. Ordinary morality treats giving to famine relief as generous but optional: it earns praise, but failing to do it earns no blame. Philosophers call such acts supererogatory, meaning good to do but beyond what duty requires. Singer argued that the traditional line between duty and charity is drawn in the wrong place. Much of what we call charity is in fact required.

How much is required? On the strong version of his principle, Singer said, we should keep giving until the point where giving more would cost us something comparable to the suffering we would prevent. Singer accepted that this could mean living very modestly.

An old idea in new clothes

The thought that everyone's good counts equally is far older than Singer. The Victorian philosopher Henry Sidgwick wrote in The Methods of Ethics (1874) that "the good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other." Sidgwick's phrase about the point of view of the universe expresses impartiality: seen from the moral standpoint, no one's welfare counts for more just because it is yours or your neighbor's.

Singer is a utilitarian, someone who holds that the right act is the one with the best overall consequences. Yet the drowning child argument does not depend on utilitarianism. It rests on a verdict about the pond that almost everyone shares and on a principle that sounds hard to deny.

The demandingness objection

The commonest response is that the conclusion simply asks too much. The demandingness objection holds that a morality requiring people to give until they are nearly as badly off as those they help cannot be correct. Morality, on this view, must leave room for personal projects, family life and ordinary pleasures. Defenders of Singer reply that the demands come from the state of the world, not from the theory: if there were less suffering, morality would ask less of us. Others take a middle path, holding that people in rich countries should give far more than they do, while denying that they must give until it hurts. A good deal of what followed Singer's essay settled on that middle path.

Worked example: the expensive shoes

Singer has often used a variation on his own case. Suppose you are wearing new shoes that cost 200 dollars, and wading into the pond would ruin them. Nearly everyone still says you must save the child. Now suppose that the same 200 dollars, given to a well-chosen health charity, could protect several families from malaria for years. Few people feel they did anything wrong when they bought the shoes.

Apply the two replies. The family at risk of malaria is far away, but on Singer's view that does not matter in itself. Many others could help them, but that does not matter either. So either buying the shoes was wrong, or something else separates the two cases. Critics have proposed candidates. At the pond you are certain your action works, while a donation passes through many hands. The pond is a rare emergency, while distant need is constant, so the duty would never end. And at the pond you alone can act right now. Each is a place where a careful reader can push back.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What does Singer's principle say, in paraphrase?
2. What did Singer say about physical distance?
3. How did Singer answer the point that many others could also help?
4. Where did Singer say the line between duty and charity is drawn?
5. What does supererogatory mean?
6. What does Sidgwick's phrase about the point of view of the universe express?
7. What does the drowning child argument depend on, according to the level?
8. What does the demandingness objection claim?

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