Sandel's challenge
Michael Sandel was a young political theorist when he published Liberalism and the Limits of Justice in 1982. Its target was the picture of the person built into Rawls's theory. Rawls, Sandel argued, depends on what he named the unencumbered self: a self that exists prior to and apart from its aims. On this picture I am one thing and my ends are another. I hold my values the way I hold possessions, and I could in principle give any of them up and still be the same person.
Sandel thought this picture was false to experience. Some of our attachments are not chosen at all, and some of them we could not shed without becoming someone else. He called these constitutive attachments: ties that partly make up who a person is. Being a daughter of particular parents, a member of a particular people, or a believer in a particular faith is not like owning a coat. It is closer to being part of what the word "I" refers to.
Why it matters for justice
Sandel argued that the unencumbered self cannot support the moral and political life we actually live. If all my obligations come from my choices, then I owe nothing to my family, town or country beyond what I have agreed to. Yet most people feel such obligations strongly, and feel them as obligations, not as preferences.
He also found a tension inside Rawls's own theory. Rawls justified the difference principle partly by saying that natural talents are, in a sense, a shared resource: no one deserves to be born gifted, so the benefits of talent may be spread to help those with less. Sandel replied that treating talents as common assets presumes a shared community whose members belong to one another in some deep way. The thin, detached self of the original position cannot supply that community. Rawls's egalitarian conclusion, on this view, borrows from the very picture of the person he set aside.
Three kinds of obligation
In later work Sandel set out three categories. Natural duties are universal duties owed to all persons as persons, such as the duty not to kill or to treat others with respect; they need no consent. Voluntary obligations arise from consent, as when I make a promise or sign a contract. The third category is the disputed one. Obligations of solidarity are particular duties we owe without having consented: to family, to fellow members of a community, to a country whose history we share.
Liberals usually accept the first two categories and doubt the third. Sandel thinks the third is needed to make sense of ordinary moral life. One test case is collective apology. A purely voluntarist view struggles here because present citizens never consented to past wrongs. Yet many people feel that a nation can owe an apology for injustices committed before they were born, because they share in its history as well as its benefits.
The procedural republic
In Democracy's Discontent (1996) Sandel turned to American politics. He argued that the United States had come to see government as a neutral referee among ways of life, a model he called the procedural republic. Its promise was freedom: the state would protect rights and leave values to individuals. Its result, he claimed, was a sense of powerlessness and a loss of shared purpose.
Against it Sandel set the older tradition of civic republicanism, in which freedom means sharing in self-government, and self-government requires citizens with certain habits and loyalties. A republic must therefore care about the character of its citizens and the places where civic virtue is learned: towns, unions, congregations and schools.
Liberal worries
Critics pressed hard. Shared purposes can crush dissenters, and history is full of communities that demanded loyalty from people they mistreated. Liberals also replied that Rawls never claimed people are actually detached; the veil was a device for thinking about fairness, not a portrait of human nature. Others noted that Sandel never said which communities deserve our loyalty, or what to do when a family, a church and a nation pull in different directions. Those questions return later in this story.
Worked example: apologizing for the past
On 13 February 2008 Australia's Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, apologized in Parliament to the Stolen Generations, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children removed from their families under past government policies. His predecessor, John Howard, had refused a formal apology, arguing in effect that people today should not be asked to accept guilt for what earlier generations did.
Howard's position fits a voluntarist view: I am responsible only for what I chose. Rudd's fits the language of solidarity: a nation that takes pride in its history must also own its wrongs. Sandel uses cases like this to show that most of us already think in the third category, even when our official theory says we should not. A liberal can still support the apology, but must explain it differently, perhaps as a duty to repair continuing harm rather than as inherited guilt. The same puzzle arises with reparations, with returning objects taken in war, and with national pride in past achievements: if a people may share the credit, can it refuse the debt?
