One of the most erudite as well as one of the most spiritual, of the literati of any age or people, and certainly the most estimable of all the extant Greek philosophers after the days of Plutarch.

In the writings of such "pagan" philosophers as Plutarch and Porphyry we find a humanitarian ethic of the most exalted kind, which, after undergoing a long repression during medieval churchdom, reappeared, albeit but weakly and fitfully at first, in the literature of the Renaissance, to be traced more definitely in the eighteenth century school of "sensibility."

As a young man Porphyry tried to gain as broad a knowledge as he possibly could by studying many languages and religions. At that time Athens was the main centre for learning, so it was natural that someone with a thirst for knowledge as Porphyry had should travel there to continue his studies. In Athens Porphyry became a student of Longinus who: — ... was a 'living library and walking museum' and the academic's critical attention to detail, clarity of style and erudition left their permanent mark on the keen student. It was Longinus who gave Porphyry that nickname. In fact it was a clever pun since 'Porphyry' means 'purple' in Greek and he was given this name since he came from Tyre which was famous for the production of the royal purple dye and his name 'Malchus' meant 'king' = 'royal' = 'purple'.

Porphyry wrote in just about every branch of learning practiced at the time but only a portion of his large output is extant. Porphyry was an influential thinker. He applied Neoplatonism to pagan religion and other spheres and is as such a key figure the promulgation of Neoplatonic thought. … His name was ‘Malcus’, ‘king’ in his native tongue, hence he became ‘Basileus’ (‘king’) in Greek. He, however, calls himself Porphyry, which supposedly was a common name in Tyre, the city of purple, and is commonly known under that name. … In reality we do not know anything with certainty about where he lived in the latter half of his life. He may have been Iamblichus' teacher. The evidence for this, however, is not beyond dispute. It is clear, though, that Iamblichus was strongly influenced by Porphyry, even if he turned vehemently against him.

So people should abstain from other animals just as they should from the human.

The Pythagoreans made kindness to beasts a training in humanity and pity.

Animals are rational; in most of them logos is imperfect, but it is certainly not wholly lacking. So if, as our opponents say, justice applies to rational beings, why should not justice, for us, also apply to animals?

Not only can logos be seen in absolutely all animals, but in many of them it has the groundwork for being perfected.

Every good thing is gentle and consistent, progressing in good order and not going beyond what is right.

I think that when friendship and perception of kinship ruled everything, no one killed any creature, because people thought the other animals were related to them.