Skip to main content

Should a utilitarian judge each act by its own results, or follow rules that tend to produce good results even when a particular act would do better by breaking them? This question split utilitarians in the twentieth century.

Act utilitarianism

The simplest version says that act utilitarianism holds that the right act is the one, among those available, with the best consequences. Rules of thumb are useful, as Mill said, but they have no authority of their own. If breaking a promise would do more good than keeping it, everything considered, then breaking it is right.

The Australian philosopher J. J. C. Smart was the view's best known modern champion. He argued that a utilitarian who sticks to a rule after seeing that breaking it would clearly do more good has lost sight of why rules matter at all. Smart called this refusal to break a rule when breaking it would do more good rule worship. Rules exist for the sake of happiness; to obey them against happiness is to treat a tool as an idol.

Critics found this alarming. If lying or promise breaking is right whenever the sums favor it, nobody could rely on a utilitarian's word.

Rule utilitarianism

Rule utilitarianism answers this worry. Rule utilitarianism holds that an act is right if it follows a rule whose general acceptance would have the best consequences. We do not ask whether this lie would do good. We ask what would happen if people generally accepted a rule permitting lies of this kind, and the answer is usually bad: trust would collapse.

Some found the view already in Mill. J. O. Urmson argued in 1953 that Mill was best read as judging acts by rules, and rules by their effects on happiness. Others doubt this reading, since Mill also said we should appeal to the principle of utility directly when rules conflict.

The collapse objection

Rule utilitarians faced a dilemma. Suppose a rule says "keep your promises," but in some case breaking a promise would do more good. The rule utilitarian could add an exception: "keep your promises, except when breaking them does more good." But then the rule tells you to do just what the act utilitarian would. The collapse objection says that if rule utilitarianism allows exceptions whenever breaking a rule does more good, it ends up recommending the same acts as act utilitarianism. In 1965 the American philosopher David Lyons argued along these lines in detail.

If, instead, the rule utilitarian refuses the exception, he seems guilty of Smart's rule worship, sacrificing happiness to a rule whose only justification was happiness.

Hooker's answer

The British philosopher Brad Hooker gave rule consequentialism its best known modern defense in 2000. He argued that rules should be judged by the results of their being accepted by the great majority, counting the costs of teaching them. A code with thousands of fine exceptions would be impossible to learn and would breed self-serving reasoning. A simpler code of firm rules, including a rule to prevent disaster, would do better. Because Hooker's rules are chosen this way, they do not simply copy act utilitarianism.

Hare's two levels

The English philosopher R. M. Hare offered a different way out in Moral Thinking (1981). He argued that moral thinking happens at two levels. Hare distinguished an intuitive level of firm everyday principles from a critical level of careful reasoning used to choose principles and settle conflicts. In daily life we should keep promises and tell the truth without recalculating, and feel guilt when we fail. In a calm hour, or when principles clash, we should think critically about what would be best.

To make the point vivid, Hare imagined two extreme figures. The archangel is a being with superhuman knowledge and no human weakness, who could always reason critically. The prole is the opposite, unable to think critically at all and wholly reliant on rules. Real people, Hare said, are a mixture, and the wise course is to know which one we are being at a given moment. Critics replied that the two levels can pull a person apart: it is hard to feel bound by a rule while believing that, in principle, it could be broken whenever the critical sums say so.

Worked example: the deathbed promise

Ana promises her dying friend that she will give his savings to his adult son. After the funeral she learns that the son has a gambling problem and will likely lose the money within months, while a children's hospital could use it to save lives. Nobody else knows of the promise.

An act utilitarian like Smart would be tempted to say the money should go to the hospital, since the gain is large and the promise is secret. A rule utilitarian would ask what would happen if people generally accepted a rule letting them break deathbed promises whenever they judged the money better used elsewhere. Dying people could no longer trust anyone with their wishes, and much comfort and security would be lost. Hooker would add that a rule allowing such exceptions would be easy to abuse. Hare would say Ana's intuitive level rightly tells her to keep her word, and that her critical level, thinking about what kind of rules people should live by, would mostly agree. Most utilitarians, by different routes, end up telling Ana to keep the promise.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What does act utilitarianism hold?
2. What did Smart call refusing to break a rule when breaking it would do more good?
3. What does rule utilitarianism hold?
4. What did J. O. Urmson argue in 1953?
5. What does the collapse objection claim?
6. How did Hooker say rules should be judged?
7. What two levels of moral thinking did Hare distinguish?
8. What does Hare's archangel stand for?

CivilSimian.com created by AxiomaticPanic, CivilSimian, Kalokagathia