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Henry Sidgwick is the least famous of the great utilitarians and, many philosophers would say, the most careful. Born in 1838, he spent his working life at Cambridge, and his Methods of Ethics (1874) is still read as a model of patient, honest argument. Where Bentham fought and Mill persuaded, Sidgwick weighed.

A life of conscience

To hold a fellowship at Trinity College, Sidgwick had to affirm the Thirty-nine Articles, the doctrinal statement of the Church of England. His religious doubts grew, and in 1869 he resigned his fellowship because he could no longer sincerely affirm the Church of England's articles of faith. Religious tests at the old universities were abolished two years later, and Cambridge soon gave him new posts. He also championed higher education for women: Sidgwick helped found Newnham College, Cambridge, in 1871, and his wife, the physicist Eleanor Balfour Sidgwick, later served as its principal.

Three methods

Sidgwick asked how a reasonable person decides what to do. He found three main methods: egoism, intuitionism and utilitarianism. Egoism tells each person to seek his own greatest happiness. Intuitionism, in its everyday form, tells us to follow rules we see to be binding, such as keeping promises and telling the truth. Utilitarianism tells us to seek the greatest happiness of all.

He examined common sense morality with great care, rule by rule. When pressed, he found, its rules turn out to be vague, to conflict with one another and to admit exceptions that the rules themselves cannot explain. How much truth do we owe a dying man? When may a promise be broken? Ordinary people settle such questions by asking what would do good or prevent harm. So Sidgwick argued that common sense morality is unconsciously utilitarian: its rules make sense as rough guides to happiness, and utilitarianism can both explain them and correct them.

Self-evident axioms

Sidgwick was no enemy of intuition. He thought a few principles really are self-evident. The axiom of justice says that similar cases should be treated alike. The axiom of prudence says we should have equal concern for all parts of our own life, so a later good counts no less than a present one simply because it is later. In his words, "Hereafter as such is to be regarded neither less nor more than Now." The axiom of benevolence says that the good of any one person matters no more, impartially considered, than the like good of any other. Together these supported utilitarianism, not as a rival to intuition but as its result.

The dualism of practical reason

Here Sidgwick reached a problem he could not solve. Egoism also seemed reasonable to him: it is hard to deny that a person has strong reason to care about his own happiness. The dualism of practical reason is his name for the clash between egoism and utilitarianism, which both seemed rational and can conflict. If giving up my life would produce more general happiness, reason seems to speak on both sides.

Only a moral order that rewarded virtue, such as a just God might provide, would bring the two together, and Sidgwick could not find good grounds to believe in one. The first edition ends on a bleak note: without such a reconciliation, "the prolonged effort of the human intellect to frame a perfect ideal of rational conduct is seen to have been foredoomed to inevitable failure."

Esoteric morality

Sidgwick also asked whether utilitarian conclusions should always be taught. A utilitarian might decide that certain exceptions to rules, such as a rare justified lie, would do good in expert hands but harm if everyone believed in them. So Sidgwick allowed that some utilitarian conclusions might be better kept from the public, since spreading them could cause harm. He even wrote that "the opinion that secrecy may render an action right which would not otherwise be so should itself be kept comparatively secret." Later critics mocked this as Government House utilitarianism, a morality for a ruling elite that does not trust the governed.

Total or average?

Sidgwick was among the first to see that utilitarians must decide what exactly to maximize when population can change. Sidgwick held that utilitarians should aim at the greatest total happiness, not the highest average. A larger population with slightly lower average happiness could therefore be better, if the total were greater. Later philosophers would find deep puzzles in this choice, and neither answer has proved easy to defend.

Worked example: a hopeful statistic

A public health agency finds that a new vaccine cuts serious illness by about half. Officials fear that announcing "half" will discourage people, and some propose rounding it up to "almost all" in public messages. More people might get vaccinated, and many lives could be saved. Sidgwick would take the proposal seriously and then press on it. The axiom of justice asks whether officials would accept being misled in the same way. Utilitarian reasoning itself warns that if the exaggeration came out, trust in every later health message would fall, perhaps costing more lives than it saved. And the esoteric policy has a further cost: once citizens suspect that officials keep a secret morality, they discount everything they are told. Even on utilitarian grounds, honest messages about a strong but imperfect vaccine are the safer bet.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. Why did Sidgwick resign his Trinity fellowship in 1869?
2. Which college did Sidgwick help to found?
3. Which were Sidgwick's three methods of ethics?
4. What did Sidgwick conclude about common sense morality?
5. What does Sidgwick's axiom of prudence say?
6. What is the dualism of practical reason?
7. What did Sidgwick say about some utilitarian conclusions?
8. What did Sidgwick think utilitarians should maximize?

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