Surveys regularly ask whether people trust scientists, doctors or "experts," and news reports treat falling numbers as a crisis. But more trust is not always better. A society that trusted everyone with a title would be easy prey for the confident and the fraudulent. The goal is trust that tracks trustworthiness: high where it is earned, lower where it is not, and responsive to new evidence.
Trust and trustworthiness
The philosopher Onora O'Neill made this point in her 2002 Reith Lectures for the BBC, titled A Question of Trust. O'Neill argued that the aim should not be more trust in general but trust placed well, in people and institutions that are actually trustworthy. She also criticized a culture of targets and audits that, she believed, often made professionals less trustworthy by pushing them to serve the measures instead of the people. She called instead for intelligent accountability, in which people with real knowledge judge whether work was done well, and results are explained to the public honestly.
Saying "we are not sure"
Experts often fear that admitting uncertainty will cost them the public's trust. A team led by Anne Marthe van der Bles and David Spiegelhalter tested this in experiments published in 2020, presenting people with figures such as unemployment numbers or the number of tigers in India, sometimes with a stated range of uncertainty. Giving a numerical range, such as an estimate plus or minus a margin, reduced trust in the figure and its source only slightly. Vaguer verbal hedges, such as saying a figure was uncertain without a range, reduced trust more. Precise honesty about uncertainty seems to be affordable.
The pandemic and public confidence
The COVID-19 pandemic tested public trust in science more sharply than any event in decades. In the United States, the Pew Research Center found that the share of adults with a great deal or fair amount of confidence that scientists act in the public's best interests fell from 87 percent in April 2020 to 73 percent in October 2023, recovering slightly the following year. The decline was driven largely by a widening gap between the two main parties, with confidence falling much further among Republicans than Democrats. Trust in experts had become, in part, a sign of political identity, which makes it harder for anyone to judge expert claims on their merits.
Calibrated trust
The habit worth building might be called calibrated trust: matching one's confidence in a source to that source's track record on the specific kind of question at hand. It sits between two easy errors. Blanket deference hands judgment to anyone with a title. Blanket cynicism hands it to whoever shouts that the experts are lying, which is simply trusting a different authority with less to show for itself.
Gathered into questions, these ideas suggest what a calibrated citizen might ask. Who are the relevant experts for this exact question? Do they broadly agree, and did they reach agreement independently? Is this a core finding or frontier work? Has the advice been tested, or only reasoned out? Who gains if I believe it? What could I check myself? And what would it cost me, and others, if I am wrong? None of these requires a degree. All of them treat the listener as a reasoning adult, and they ask experts in turn to treat the public as equals who are owed reasons, not merely instructions.
Worked example: masks in 2020
In February and March 2020, the World Health Organization and US health officials advised healthy members of the public not to wear masks. Part of the reasoning was scientific, since evidence about masks against this new virus was limited and it was not yet clear how much spread came from people without symptoms. Part of it was a worry about supplies: officials wanted scarce masks kept for health workers. Some public messages blurred the two, implying masks did not work at all.
As evidence grew that people without symptoms could spread the virus, advice changed. The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommended cloth face coverings on April 3, 2020, and the WHO updated its guidance in June. Many people saw a flip-flop and concluded that experts were making things up.
A calibrated reading looks different. Changing advice in response to new evidence is what good experts should do. The real mistake was mixing a judgment about evidence with a judgment about supply without saying so, and presenting a tentative view with more certainty than the evidence allowed. A citizen in March 2020 could have asked the questions above: this was frontier science about a new virus, so confident claims either way deserved caution; the supply concern was a different kind of reason from the medical one; and the cost of wearing a cloth mask was low. Experts who say plainly what they know, what they do not and why their advice might change give the public the means to judge them fairly, and that is the kind of trust worth having.
