Distrust of experts is often treated as a symptom of ignorance. Sometimes it is. But some doubts are well founded, and a citizen who cannot tell a reasonable doubt from a stubborn one will either swallow too much or reject too much.
Values inside the evidence
In 1953 the philosopher Richard Rudner published a short paper with a provocative title, "The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments." His argument was simple. No hypothesis is ever proved with certainty, so a scientist must decide whether the evidence is strong enough to accept it. Rudner argued that how strong the evidence must be depends on how serious it would be to get the answer wrong. We demand far more confidence before declaring that a medicine contains no toxic ingredient than before declaring a batch of belt buckles free of defects.
Philosophers now call this inductive risk: the chance of error that remains when a conclusion is accepted, and the question of whose costs that error would impose. The philosopher Heather Douglas has argued that this makes values unavoidable in scientific advice. Citizens may legitimately question those choices. Accepting the data on a chemical's effects is one thing. Agreeing on how much risk is acceptable, and for whom, is another, and it is not a purely technical matter.
Follow the funding, carefully
In 1967 two Harvard nutrition scientists published a review in the New England Journal of Medicine that played down sugar's role in heart disease and pointed to dietary fat instead. In 2016 researchers digging in archives showed that a sugar industry group, the Sugar Research Foundation, had paid for the review and seen drafts, and the funding was not disclosed.
The pattern is wider than one case. A 2003 review in the BMJ found that drug studies funded by industry were about four times as likely to report results favoring the sponsor's product as studies funded by others. Funding is not proof of fraud. Companies pay for much excellent research, and public funders have agendas too. But interests are a fair reason to look harder at methods, ask whether a trial was registered before it began, and check whether results have been confirmed by people with no stake in them. Dismissing a finding solely because of who paid for it is a shortcut, not an argument.
Knowledge from the ground
After the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986, radioactive caesium fell with the rain on the hills of Cumbria in northern England. Government scientists restricted the sale of sheep and predicted that the restrictions would last only a few weeks, because in lowland clay soils caesium becomes locked away. But in the acidic, peaty upland soils the caesium stayed mobile and kept passing into the grass, and restrictions on some farms lasted until 2012.
The sociologist Brian Wynne studied the farmers' experience. The experts had also dismissed what the farmers knew about how sheep graze the fells, how water moves on the hills and what was practical on a working farm. Wynne argued that the experts' failure was social as well as factual: they ignored practical knowledge held by the people they were advising.
Patients who learned the science
In the 1980s, people with AIDS faced a slow drug approval system and trials in which some dying patients received only a placebo. Activists in groups such as ACT UP did more than protest. They studied virology and trial design, met with researchers and argued for faster access and broader trial entry. In 1992 the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) created an accelerated approval pathway, shaped in part by their pressure.
The sociologist Steven Epstein, in his 1996 book Impure Science, showed that the activists gained enough expertise to be treated as partners in designing research. Critics fairly note that faster approval brings risks: some drugs approved quickly later proved disappointing, and confirmatory trials sometimes lag for years. Even so, the episode shows that the people most affected can sometimes improve expert practice rather than merely resist it.
Doubt and denial
How can one tell reasonable doubt from denial? Reasonable doubt aims at a specific claim, names the evidence that would settle it and accepts the same standards it applies to others. Denial tends to reject a whole field, moves the goalposts each time evidence arrives and treats every expert who disagrees as corrupt. A useful test is whether the doubter can say what evidence would change their mind.
Worked example: the wells of Woburn
In the 1970s Anne Anderson, a mother in Woburn, Massachusetts, noticed that her son was one of several children in her neighborhood with leukemia. She suspected the water. Officials at first said such clusters often arise by chance, which is true. In 1979, though, two city wells were found to be contaminated with industrial solvents and were shut.
Residents then worked with biostatisticians from the Harvard School of Public Health on a survey, and a 1984 study found an association between the wells' water and childhood leukemia. Other scientists criticized its methods. A later state study also found an association. The sociologist Phil Brown called this kind of partnership popular epidemiology. The case shows both sides of reasonable doubt: the residents' suspicion was worth investigating, and the answer still had to come from careful study that others could criticize.
