For most of history, populations were shaped like pyramids: many children at the bottom, few elders at the top. In much of the world that shape is turning into something closer to a column. This is one of the great achievements of modern times, the result of children surviving and adults living longer. It also raises hard questions about work, care and fairness.
Why societies age
Population aging has two engines. Population aging is driven by both longer lives and falling birth rates, and in most rich countries the fall in births has done more to change the age structure than longer lives have. Japan is the leading example: about three in ten of its people are 65 or older, the highest share of any large country. The United Nations projects that by the late 2070s, people aged 65 and over will outnumber children under 18 worldwide.
Economists often track the old-age dependency ratio: the number of people over 65 for every hundred people of working age. It is a useful warning light, but crude. It treats every 66-year-old as dependent and every 30-year-old as a worker, which is far from true. What matters economically is how many people actually work and produce, not how many pass a particular birthday. A country where more women, older people and young adults have jobs can support an aging population far more easily than its headcount suggests.
Moving the line of old age
The demographers Warren Sanderson and Sergei Scherbov argue that we measure age the wrong way. Counting years since birth ignores the fact that a 65-year-old today can expect many more healthy years than one in 1950. They propose prospective age, which looks forward instead of backward. Prospective age measures age by the number of years a person can still expect to live. By this measure the point at which people become "old" has been moving later, and many societies are aging much less quickly than the usual figures imply. Critics note that gains in healthy years are not shared equally. In many countries, people with less education or lower incomes die years earlier and spend more of their later years in poor health, so a policy keyed to averages can be unfair to them.
Ageism
In 1969 the American psychiatrist Robert Butler coined the word ageism. Butler defined ageism as stereotyping and discrimination against people because of their age. A World Health Organization report in 2021 estimated that one in every two people in the world holds ageist attitudes toward older people. Ageism also runs the other way: young people are dismissed as naive or lazy, while older workers are passed over for jobs and training. Both clash with the principle that every person has equal worth at every stage of life.
Can governments raise birth rates?
Alarmed by shrinking workforces, many governments now try to encourage births through baby bonuses, tax breaks, parental leave and subsidized childcare. The record is sobering. Studies generally find that cash incentives for having children have only modest effects on birth rates, often shifting the timing of births more than their number. Policies that make it easier to combine work and family, such as reliable childcare and fairer sharing of housework, appear to do somewhat better, but no rich country has used them to restore birth rates of the past. There is also a firm moral limit. Some twentieth-century regimes banned contraception or abortion to raise births; Romania under Nicolae Ceausescu did so from 1966, with grim results for women and for children abandoned to orphanages. A humane population policy can widen people's real choices but must never override their freedom to decide whether to have children. People are not instruments of a national growth target.
Who does the caring?
Aging also raises a question of care. Most care for frail older people is unpaid and given by family members, most of them women, often in their fifties and sixties while still working. Paid care work is poorly paid and frequently done by migrants. Fairness between generations therefore includes fairness between men and women and between countries.
Worked example: Japan adapts
Japan's population peaked around 2008 and has been falling since. Its responses show both the options and their limits. It introduced public long-term care insurance in 2000, spreading the cost of care across society instead of leaving it to daughters and daughters-in-law. A 2021 change in employment law asks employers to make efforts to keep willing employees working until 70. From 2019 Japan opened new visa routes for foreign workers in sectors such as nursing care. Longer working lives rely on the logic of prospective age rather than birthdays. Care insurance shares a burden that the family system had placed mostly on women. The worry about ageism cuts both ways: keeping older people at work respects their abilities only if it is a real choice, not a necessity forced by thin pensions, and the unequal spread of healthy years means a manual worker at 68 may not be in the same position as an office worker. Despite years of family policy, births have kept falling, which fits the evidence that money alone changes family decisions only a little.
