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Suppose neuroscience were finished. Every neuron mapped, every signal traced, every behavior predicted. Would we then understand consciousness? Many scientists assume so. In 1994 a young Australian philosopher named David Chalmers stood up at a conference in Tucson, Arizona, and argued that the answer might be no. His talk, and his 1995 paper "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness", gave the puzzle the name it still carries.

Easy problems and the hard one

Chalmers sorted questions about the mind into two kinds. The easy problems are about explaining functions: how the brain tells colors apart, combines information from different senses, focuses attention, controls behavior, reports on its own states, and switches between sleep and waking. They are not easy in any everyday sense. They are easy because we know what kind of answer would solve them: find the mechanism that performs the function. Once you show how a system discriminates red from green, you have explained discrimination.

The hard problem is different. It asks why the performance of these functions is accompanied by experience at all. Why does all this information processing feel like something from the inside, instead of running in the dark? Explaining every function, Chalmers argued, seems to leave this question standing, because it is not a question about a function.

An old worry in a new form

The puzzle is not new. In his Monadology of 1714 the German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz imagined a thinking machine enlarged to the size of a mill, so that we could walk inside it. We would see only parts pushing on one another, he said, and "never anything by which to explain a perception." In 1866 the English biologist Thomas Henry Huxley wrote that how "a state of consciousness comes about as the result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of the Djin" when Aladdin rubbed his lamp.

In 1983 the American philosopher Joseph Levine gave this jump a name: the explanatory gap. Even if pain is identical to some pattern of nerve firing, Levine argued, we cannot see why that firing should feel the way pain feels, or feel like anything. When we learn that water is H2O, the chemistry explains water's boiling point and its power to dissolve salt. Nothing similar makes it intelligible that a brain process should hurt.

The lesson of life

Physicalists, who think everything is ultimately physical, often answer with history. In the nineteenth century many biologists held that life could not be explained by chemistry alone and required a special vital force. The view, called vitalism, faded as scientists explained metabolism, growth and reproduction. No leftover mystery of life remained. Perhaps, physicalists say, consciousness will go the same way.

Chalmers replied that the cases differ. With life, the functions were all there was to explain: once you account for metabolism, reproduction and the rest, there is no further question about why the cell is alive. With consciousness, the question of experience remains after the functions are explained. Critics answer that this is exactly what vitalists once said about life, and that our sense of a leftover may fade as science matures.

Responses and the meta-problem

Thinkers have taken three broad lines. Some accept the hard problem and conclude that experience must be something more than physical processing, or a basic feature of the world. Some accept that there is a gap in our understanding but deny that it shows a gap in reality: it reflects the way our concepts work. And some, most famously the American philosopher Daniel Dennett, deny that there is a hard problem at all, holding that once the functions are explained, nothing is left.

In 2018 Chalmers proposed a way to make progress whichever side is right. The meta-problem of consciousness asks why we think and say there is a hard problem. Our reports and intuitions are behaviors produced by brains, so explaining them is itself an easy problem. Any full theory should explain why creatures like us find consciousness so puzzling, and the answer might show which side is right.

Worked example: a stubbed toe

You stub your toe on a bed frame at night. Here is the story science can tell, in outline. Damage-sensing nerve endings fire. Signals race up the spinal cord. A reflex pulls the foot back before you know what happened. Further signals reach regions that locate the injury, others that color it as unpleasant, and others that drive you to hop, wince and swear. Later you tell someone, "That really hurt."

Each step is a function: detecting, routing, withdrawing, evaluating, reporting. Science can in principle explain every one. Now ask the hard question. Why is there, in addition, the throbbing awfulness you felt? Imagine the same chain of events running without any feeling, the body hopping and the mouth swearing, while nothing is experienced. Is that coherent?

If you think it is, you feel the pull of the hard problem. If you think that once every step is explained the hurt is explained, you side with its critics. Either way, the example shows what the argument is about: not whether the brain is involved, which nobody serious denies, but whether describing its work could ever add up to describing how it feels.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. Where did Chalmers first present the hard problem, in 1994?
2. Why does Chalmers call some problems of mind easy?
3. What does the hard problem ask?
4. What did Leibniz imagine walking inside, in 1714?
5. What is the explanatory gap, as Joseph Levine described it?
6. Why does Chalmers say vitalism is a poor model for consciousness?
7. What does the meta-problem of consciousness ask?
8. What position did Daniel Dennett take on the hard problem?

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