This momentous finding of nonlocality has, in common with that of Einstein concerning time, the additional feature that it disproves the validity, not of a "view of the World", but of a deeply ingrained concept. And this brings me to the second reason. It is that this disproof of a deeply ingrained concept pointed in fact in a direction quite consonant with my own line of thought. In a way, it brings us back to Descartes, for, as we all know, Descartes was the first scientist who dared to question our common views, including even all the notions that had always seemed so primitive and obvious that thinkers, scientists and so on never hesitated in making use of them. He found out that, at the start, he could doubt of everything but his own thinking, and in this, according to Hegel, he was a hero. Unfortunately he then constructed a grand metaphysical argument that led him to the view that, after all, since God is not a liar, the "obvious" realistic concepts must apply. He thereby founded mechanicism, which is the theory that, apart from thought, everything has to be described by the exclusive means of familiar concepts. We know, of course, how deficient such a view is. But I think Descartes' really significant contribution on these matters is not mechanicism. It is what I just said. In other words, it is the realization that a sharp distinction has to be made between rationality on the one hand and the use of seemingly obvious concepts on the other hand. And that therefore, if you are a rational person you cannot demand that science should be based exclusively on seemingly obvious concepts without first logically justifying this demand. This Descartes tried to do but, since his argument based on God not being a liar is now considered as not convincing enough, we are not bound to his conclusion. Indeed, I consider that we are not even bound to the idea that physics should be expressed in an ontological language, which was more or less Einstein's view. The older Einstein seems to have considered that Reality, and even physical objects in the plural, can be described as they really are, if not by familiar concepts, at least by unfamiliar ones, such as those borrowed from mathematics. I do not think this is necessarily true. I consider that mere predictive rules, such as the Born rule in quantum mechanics, count as fully fledged explanations, or, more precisely, as constituting, when all taken together, a first step in an explanation, the second step being the philosophical idea that these predictive rules dimly reflect some existing, largely hidden structures of Mind-Independent Reality. Of course, these speculations of mine go much further than nonlocality. But you understand that they receive some support from it.