On 22 January 1879, at the foot of a sphinx shaped hill called Isandlwana, a Zulu army overran a British camp and killed more than 1,300 of its defenders, among them hundreds of African soldiers serving under British command. It was one of the worst defeats a modern European army suffered in Africa. Within six months, though, the Zulu capital was in flames and the king was a prisoner. To understand both the victory and the defeat, start with a long peace and the policy that ended it.
Mpande's long peace
Mpande, made king with trekker help in 1840, ruled for more than thirty years, longer than any Zulu king before him. He avoided war with the British in Natal and with the Boers, and the kingdom recovered. But his sons fought over the succession. In December 1856, at the Battle of Ndondakusuka near the Thukela River, Cetshwayo defeated his brother Mbuyazi, and thousands of Mbuyazi's followers died, many drowned in the river. When Mpande died in 1872, Cetshwayo became king.
Cetshwayo was installed in 1873, and the Natal official Theophilus Shepstone attended a second ceremony at which he proclaimed laws limiting executions. Cetshwayo saw this as diplomacy; British officials later treated the laws as promises he had broken.
Confederation and the ultimatum
In the 1870s London wanted to join Britain's colonies and the Boer republics in southern Africa into a single confederation, cheaper to defend and easier to run. Britain annexed the Transvaal in 1877 and with it inherited a bitter border dispute between the Boers and the Zulu. A commission appointed by the Natal government examined the dispute and, in 1878, found largely in favor of the Zulu. The new High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, believed the independent Zulu army was a danger to confederation, and he used the border award as an occasion to strike.
On 11 December 1878 Frere's officials read the award to Zulu envoys and then delivered an ultimatum. Some demands concerned an incident in which relatives of a chief named Sihayo had crossed into Natal and dragged back and killed two of his wives who had fled there. But the key demand went to the heart of the kingdom. Cetshwayo was told to disband the amabutho, the regiment system, and let young men marry freely, and to accept a British resident. No king could agree and remain king. Frere acted ahead of clear approval from London.
The invasion
British forces under Lord Chelmsford crossed into Zululand on 11 January 1879. At Isandlwana, Chelmsford took about half the main column out of camp to search for the Zulu army, leaving the rest spread out and without a fortified perimeter. The Zulu force, perhaps 20,000 strong and commanded by Ntshingwayo kaMahole, had in fact moved close and hidden in a valley nearby. When discovered, it attacked in the horns formation and overran the camp. The British force had breech loading rifles but had not entrenched or circled its wagons.
That night and the next day, some 3,000 to 4,000 Zulu who had not fought at Isandlwana attacked the small mission station at Rorke's Drift, defended by about 150 men behind walls of grain bags and biscuit boxes. They held out. The attackers had crossed into Natal against Cetshwayo's orders, for the king hoped to show Britain that he was only defending his own land. Britain awarded eleven Victoria Crosses for the defense, and the story helped soften the news of Isandlwana at home.
The war did not go the Zulu way everywhere. In late March a British column under Evelyn Wood was mauled at Hlobane mountain, but the next day it beat off a great Zulu attack on its fortified camp at Kambula, a defeat that cost the Zulu dearly. In June the Prince Imperial, heir of the deposed French emperor Napoleon III, who had joined the British force as an observer, was killed while on patrol, a death that caused a sensation in Europe.
The British sent reinforcements and invaded again. On 4 July 1879, at Ulundi, a British square of about 5,000 men broke the last great Zulu attack with rifle volleys, artillery and Gatling guns, and then burned oNdini, the royal homestead. Cetshwayo was captured in August.
Worked example: why Isandlwana was won and lost
Popular accounts once blamed the British defeat on a single cause, often a story that ammunition boxes could not be opened fast enough. Historians who have studied the field and the testimony now point to a chain of decisions and conditions.
On the British side, Chelmsford divided his force without knowing where the enemy was. The camp was not entrenched or laagered, although experienced Boer advisers, Paul Kruger among them, had urged laagering. The firing line was stretched too thin across broken ground. On the Zulu side, Ntshingwayo's army moved fast and secretly, and its commanders kept their force together and attacked from more than one direction.
The lesson is that a battle is rarely decided by one dramatic detail. Isandlwana shows how a stronger power, overconfident about its technology, can be beaten by an opponent who understands its ground, and how a single victory cannot undo a huge gap in resources over a whole war.
