In the middle of the eleventh century the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad was a ruler mostly in name. The caliphs still claimed to lead the Sunni Muslim community as successors of the Prophet, and their names still appeared on coins and in Friday sermons across much of the Islamic world. But for about a century real power in Baghdad had belonged to the Buyids, a Shia dynasty from northern Iran, who ruled Iraq and western Iran and kept the caliph as an honored figurehead. Meanwhile a rival caliphate, the Ismaili Shia Fatimids of Cairo, held Egypt and much of Syria and hoped to win the rest.
Into Baghdad
Tughril spent the 1040s and early 1050s taking the cities of Iran one by one, including Rayy, near modern Tehran, and Isfahan. He wrote to the caliph al-Qa'im stressing his loyalty and his Sunni faith. By 1055 the Buyid state was divided and weak, and the caliph's circle saw the Seljuks as a better protector than either the Buyids or the Fatimids. Tughril entered Baghdad in December 1055, and soon afterward he arrested the last Buyid ruler of Iraq, al-Malik al-Rahim, who died in captivity.
The Seljuk leader now needed a title that fit the new arrangement. He was not a caliph and did not claim to be. He became known as sultan, an Arabic word meaning power or authority, which had been used loosely as an honorific and now became the regular title of a ruler. In a ceremony in 1058 the caliph received Tughril, gave him robes of honor and hailed him with the title King of the East and the West. The caliph kept the dignity of religious headship. The sultan held the army and the revenue.
The Basasiri crisis
The arrangement nearly collapsed at once. While Tughril was fighting a revolt by his half brother Ibrahim Inal in western Iran, a Turkish general named al-Basasiri, who had served the Buyids, marched on Baghdad with Fatimid money and backing. In late 1058 al-Basasiri took Baghdad and had the sermon read for the Fatimid caliph of Cairo. The Abbasid caliph al-Qa'im was sent away under guard. For about a year the old capital of Sunni Islam prayed for a Shia caliph.
Tughril defeated his brother, returned at the end of 1059 and restored al-Qa'im with great ceremony; one account says the sultan walked holding the bridle of the caliph's mule. Al-Basasiri was killed in battle early in 1060. The crisis became a gift to Seljuk propaganda: Tughril could now present himself as the rescuer of the Abbasid caliph, the sword of Sunni Islam against its enemies.
A marriage and a succession
Tughril then demanded a bride from the caliph's own family, a request that horrified the court, since it would bind the house of the Prophet's kin to a Turkish soldier. Al-Qa'im resisted but finally gave Tughril his daughter in 1063. Tughril died that same year at Rayy, before the marriage was consummated, and he left no son. His nephew Alp Arslan, son of Chaghri, won the throne only after defeating a cousin, Qutalmish, who died in the fighting in 1064. Qutalmish's sons will reappear, for one of them founded a Seljuk state in Anatolia.
Was there a Sunni revival?
Older histories describe the Seljuks as champions of a Sunni revival, rolling back a century of Shia dominance. There is something to this. The Seljuks backed Sunni scholars, founded colleges and fought the Fatimids. But recent historians, notably A. C. S. Peacock, stress that Seljuk religious policy was often pragmatic. Shia officials served the sultans, the sultans quarreled with caliphs when it suited them, and religious language was a useful tool for winning cities. The revival story suited the chroniclers better than it fits the untidy record.
Worked example: power and authority
Political thinkers distinguish power, the ability to make people obey, from authority, the accepted right to command. The caliph and sultan split the two between different people. The jurist al-Mawardi, who died in 1058, had already worked out a theory for this. Al-Mawardi argued that a caliph could lawfully confirm a ruler who had seized power by force, provided that ruler upheld the religious law and recognized the caliph.
Consider a judge in Isfahan in 1065. Who appointed him? Formally the caliph, whose name made the appointment lawful in the eyes of believers. Who paid him and enforced his rulings? The sultan's officials. If a merchant defied a verdict, it was the sultan's soldiers who would knock on his door. Each partner needed the other. The caliph needed protection and income; the sultan needed a legitimacy that his tribal origins could not supply.
The arrangement worked as long as neither side tried to swallow the other. Later sultans tried to control the caliphs completely, and later caliphs tried to raise armies of their own, which is why the partnership was so often tense. The same puzzle, how to tie raw force to accepted right, faces every government that comes to power by the sword and then wants to be obeyed willingly.
