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Every government does things that would be crimes if a private person did them. It takes money by force, locks people up and, in war, may order them to kill or to die. In the early fifth century Augustine asked what separates a kingdom from a gang of thieves, and his answer was blunt: "Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms but great robberies?" The social contract tradition offers one of the boldest replies to that question. On this view, political authority is legitimate because the people subject to it have agreed to it, or would agree to it under fair conditions.

The problem of political obligation

Philosophers call the underlying puzzle the problem of political obligation: why, if at all, are we bound to obey a law simply because it is the law? Older answers pointed upward. Kings ruled by the grace of God, or by inheritance from a first father, or because some people were born fit to command. The contract answer points sideways, to the people themselves. It begins from a quietly revolutionary premise: no one is born with a natural right to rule anyone else, so authority has to be built out of the agreement of equals.

Old seeds

The idea is ancient. In Plato's Republic, Plato's brother Glaucon plays devil's advocate. He describes the popular view that justice is a bargain struck by the weak: people found that suffering wrongs hurt more than doing them helped, so they agreed neither to do injustice nor to suffer it, and made laws to hold that bargain in place. Epicurus, a generation later, called justice "a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed."

A different seed lies in Plato's Crito. Socrates sits in prison awaiting execution, and his friend Crito has arranged an escape. Socrates refuses. He imagines the Laws of Athens speaking to him and pointing out that he could have emigrated at any time. By staying in Athens all his life when he was free to leave, the Laws argue, Socrates had in effect agreed to obey them.

Two kinds of contract

Medieval and Reformation writers often spoke of an agreement between a ruler and the ruled. After the St Bartholomew's Day massacre of 1572, when thousands of French Protestants were killed, Huguenot writers sharpened the idea. The Vindiciae contra tyrannos (1579) argued that kings rule under covenants with God and with the people, and that lesser magistrates may resist a king who breaks them. Political theorists separate two models here. A contract of government is an agreement between a people and its ruler, while a contract of society is an agreement among individuals to form a political community. The great modern theorists mostly worked with the second, and that shift matters. If the ruler is not a party to the deal, the ruler's authority depends entirely on what the people set up among themselves.

Real event or thought experiment?

A contract story can do three jobs. It can explain how governments actually arose, justify why they have authority, or derive the content of justice and morality. Historians found little evidence that any such agreement took place. Most modern contract theorists treat the agreement as hypothetical: a test of what free and equal people could accept, not a record of a past event. That move escapes the historian's objection but invites a sharper one: why should an agreement I never actually made bind me?

Two families

Over time the tradition split into two broad families, and keeping them apart prevents much confusion. Contractarians, following Hobbes, ground morality in mutual advantage among self-interested people, while contractualists, following Rousseau and Kant, ground it in principles each person could accept as fair. Both share the conviction that rules must earn the assent of those they bind, and both have to say whose assent counts.

Worked example: the debates at Putney

In late October 1647, after Parliament's army had defeated King Charles I, officers and elected representatives of the soldiers met in St Mary's Church at Putney, near London. They debated a draft constitution called the Agreement of the People, which was meant to be signed by the people themselves: a social contract in its most literal form. Colonel Thomas Rainsborough put the consent principle plainly: "the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live, as the greatest he; and therefore truly, Sir, I think it's clear, that every man that is to live under a Government ought first by his own consent to put himself under that Government."

Commissary General Henry Ireton replied that only men with "a permanent fixed interest" in the kingdom, chiefly holders of land, should choose its lawmakers, or a poor majority might vote away property. The Agreement was a contract of society, not a deal with the king; it tried to set limits even on Parliament. Rainsborough treats consent as owed to each person because each has a life to live, which is the equality premise in plain English. Yet the argument turned at once from whether consent matters to whose consent counts. Servants were in doubt, and no one in the room proposed that women should consent at all. That gap between the promise of the contract and the people it actually included runs through the whole tradition.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. On the social contract view, what makes political authority legitimate?
2. What premise about ruling does the contract tradition start from?
3. In the Republic, how does Glaucon describe the popular view of justice?
4. What did Augustine ask about kingdoms without justice?
5. What separates a contract of government from a contract of society?
6. How do most modern contract theorists treat the original agreement?
7. What separates contractarians from contractualists?
8. What did the Huguenot Vindiciae contra tyrannos argue in 1579?

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