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By the 1940s pragmatism seemed to be fading. In American universities a new style of philosophy arrived, much of it carried by refugees from Hitler's Europe, such as the logical positivists Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach. It stressed formal logic, the analysis of language and narrow technical problems. Dewey's sweeping books on democracy and experience looked old-fashioned to many younger philosophers. Yet pragmatist ideas kept surfacing, often unacknowledged, and by the end of the century the movement had a vigorous second life.

Quiet influence

One route back ran through logic itself. The Harvard philosopher W. V. O. Quine, in his famous 1951 paper "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," argued that our beliefs face experience not one by one but as a whole web. Quine concluded that when experience surprises us, we revise our web of belief on broadly pragmatic grounds, choosing changes that keep the system simple and workable. He described his own position as a more thorough pragmatism. Others, such as Wilfrid Sellars and later Robert Brandom, developed the idea that meaning lies in social practices of giving and asking for reasons, a theme Brandom explicitly traced back to the pragmatists.

Putnam's turn

The Harvard philosopher Hilary Putnam (1926 to 2016) began as a leading figure in hard-edged analytic philosophy and moved, over decades, toward pragmatism. In Reason, Truth and History (1981) he attacked the idea that we could ever compare our whole system of concepts with reality from some outside standpoint, which he called the "God's Eye point of view." He did not conclude that anything goes. He held that truth is still objective, but objective within our best practices of inquiry, not measured against a view from nowhere.

Putnam later wrote extensively on James and Dewey, much of it with his wife, the philosopher Ruth Anna Putnam. One theme he took from them is that facts and values are entangled: our descriptions of the world are shot through with evaluation, and our values answer to facts. Words like "cruel" or "rude" both describe and evaluate at once. In The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy (2002) he argued that the sharp split between objective facts and merely subjective values, common in economics and social science, was a mistake with real costs, because it led people to treat ethical questions as matters of taste beyond reasoned argument.

Misak and the return to Peirce

The Canadian philosopher Cheryl Misak has led a revival of Peirce's side of the tradition. In Truth and the Aftermath of Inquiry (1991) and later books she defended a Peircean account of truth: a true belief is one that would never be defeated by evidence and argument, however far inquiry was pursued. That is an aim, not a finished possession, and it keeps truth objective while explaining why we care about it.

In Truth, Politics, Morality (2000) she drew a democratic lesson. If a belief is true only when it would survive all the evidence, then we must take seriously the experiences and arguments of every person, since anyone might hold the evidence that defeats our view. On Misak's account, open deliberation is not merely polite. It is required by the pursuit of truth itself. In Cambridge Pragmatism (2016) she also traced how Peirce's ideas reached the English philosopher Frank Ramsey and, through him, the later Wittgenstein.

Other voices

The revival was not limited to academic theory. In The American Evasion of Philosophy (1989), Cornel West traced a line of pragmatist thought from Emerson through Dewey and W. E. B. Du Bois, who had studied with James at Harvard, and proposed what he called prophetic pragmatism, joining pragmatist method to a moral struggle against oppression. Feminist philosophers such as Charlene Haddock Seigfried recovered Addams and other women whose work had been left out of the standard story.

What remains contested

Old objections remain. Some still argue that pragmatist accounts of truth confuse what is true with what we would believe. Others think its faith in inquiry underrates deep conflicts of interest and power. Defenders answer that pragmatism's lasting contribution is less a definition than a habit of mind: fallible, experimental, attentive to consequences, and committed to the idea that people with different experiences must think together.

Worked example: a pilot bus lane

A city creates a bus-only lane on a busy street for a one-year trial. Supporters and opponents both insist they already know the outcome. A pragmatist city council treats the lane as an experiment. Before it opens, the council states what would count as success: faster bus times, no large rise in crashes, and shops not losing customers. Those are the practical effects that give "the lane works" its meaning.

Following Misak, the council collects evidence from everyone affected, including disabled riders, delivery drivers and shopkeepers, because any of them might know something that defeats the official view. Following Putnam, it does not pretend that the numbers alone settle the matter: deciding how much delay for drivers is fair against time saved for bus riders is a judgment about values, which still answers to facts. At year's end the lane may be kept, changed or removed, and the conclusion stays open to revision.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What did Quine conclude in Two Dogmas of Empiricism about surprising experience?
2. What did Putnam reject as the God's Eye point of view?
3. What did Putnam argue about facts and values?
4. How did Misak describe a true belief?
5. What democratic lesson did Misak draw from her account of truth?
6. Through whom did Misak trace Peirce's influence on the later Wittgenstein?
7. What did Cornel West call his version of pragmatism?
8. Who among the following developed the idea that meaning lies in practices of giving and asking for reasons?

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