Most of the thinkers met so far were French. The best known American who took up their ideas came from a family of reformers. Richard Rorty (1931 to 2007) was a grandson of Walter Rauschenbusch, a leading preacher of the Social Gospel, and the son of left-wing writers. He taught at Princeton, Virginia and Stanford, and he spent his career arguing that philosophy could give up its search for foundations without giving up on democracy, decency or human rights.
Against the mirror
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Rorty attacked a picture he traced to Descartes and Locke. On that picture, the mind is a mirror that reflects the world, and philosophy is the discipline that checks how accurate the mirror is. Rorty argued that we should give up the picture of the mind as a mirror that represents reality accurately. Knowledge, he proposed, is a matter of justification: of what we can defend to one another in conversation, not of a match between mind and world that could be checked from outside every conversation.
He drew on the American pragmatists, above all John Dewey and William James. James had written in 1907: "The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons." Pragmatists judge beliefs by how well they help us cope with the world, not by a match with reality checked from outside.
The world and its descriptions
Rorty was often accused of denying that the world exists. He did not. Rorty held that the world is out there, but descriptions of the world are human creations. Rocks and stars do not care how we talk about them. But truth belongs to sentences, and sentences are made by people using vocabularies they invented. No vocabulary is the world's own language, and we cannot step outside all of them to compare each with reality and pick the winner.
The liberal ironist
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989) described the kind of person Rorty admired. Everyone, he said, has a final vocabulary: the words, such as "kindness," "progress" or "God," with which they justify their deepest commitments, and beyond which they can only fall back on circular argument. Rorty's ironist knows that her own deepest vocabulary is contingent and could be replaced. She does not think it is closer to reality than other vocabularies.
His liberal took a definition from the political theorist Judith Shklar. A liberal, in this sense, is someone who ranks cruelty as the worst of all wrongs. The liberal ironist combines the two: she holds her beliefs without metaphysical backing and still devotes herself to reducing cruelty. Rorty proposed a division of labor. In private life, writers such as Nietzsche or Proust can help a person reinvent herself. In public life, writers such as Orwell and Dickens help us notice suffering we have caused or ignored.
Rights through stories
In a 1993 lecture for Amnesty International at Oxford, Rorty applied these ideas to human rights. Philosophers, he argued, have spent centuries trying to ground rights in reason or human nature, with little effect on those who commit atrocities. What has actually spread the culture of rights is what he called sentimental education: stories, reporting and novels that lead people to see strangers as like themselves. Rorty argued that human rights spread more through sentimental education than through philosophical proofs. Moral progress, on this view, means widening the circle of people we count as "us." His example was the novel Uncle Tom's Cabin, which moved readers more than any treatise.
Objections
Critics pressed hard. If nothing grounds rights, what can we say to the torturer who rejects them? Rorty replied that no argument would convince such a person anyway; foundations never stopped cruelty, while stories and institutions sometimes did. The philosopher Susan Haack accused him of a vulgar pragmatism that gave up on real inquiry. Others worried that sentiment can shrink circles as easily as widen them.
Rorty also turned his eye on his own side. In Achieving Our Country (1998) Rorty warned that a left focused on culture over economic inequality would leave workers open to a strongman. His passage was widely recirculated two decades later.
Worked example: arguing for refugees
A town debates whether to accept a group of refugee families. One speaker offers a foundational argument: every human being has rational nature and therefore equal dignity, so turning them away is wrong. Another tells the story of one family: a father who was a pharmacist, a daughter who wants to study medicine, a winter journey on foot. A Rortian would expect the second speech to move more people, and would urge supporters to arrange meetings, publish the family's account in the local paper and let neighbors see faces.
The example also shows the weakness critics see. A rival speaker can tell a frightening story about crime, true or false, and the circle may shrink. Rorty's answer is better stories and fair institutions. Critics answer that this leaves rights hostage to whoever tells the most moving tale, which is why many insist that the first speaker's argument still matters, even if it rarely wins a crowd by itself.
