Astrology columns still run in newspapers around the world, and homeopathic remedies sit on pharmacy shelves beside drugs tested in large trials. Most scientists call both pseudoscience. But saying exactly why is harder than it looks, and the answer matters to courts, school boards and anyone deciding whom to believe. This level takes up the demarcation problem, how to tell science from its imitations, and then a related question: what role, if any, should values play inside science?
The demise and revival of demarcation
Popper's falsifiability was the most famous answer, and it ran into an awkward fact: astrology makes plenty of testable claims, and they have been tested and failed. That makes astrology bad science, perhaps, but science of a kind. In an essay of 1983 Larry Laudan declared the demarcation problem dead. He argued that no set of necessary and sufficient conditions for being scientific had ever worked, and that the search should end. The question that matters, he said, is whether a claim is well supported by evidence, not whether it carries the label of science.
Others were not ready to give up. In 1978 the Canadian philosopher Paul Thagard had offered a historical test. On his account, astrology is pseudoscience because it made little progress while its practitioners ignored its problems, even as rival explanations of personality and events advanced. What marks pseudoscience is not a single failed prediction but a community that stops learning. More recent writers have taken a cluster approach: pseudoscience is marked by a cluster of traits rather than one decisive test, such as claiming the authority of science, explaining away failures, resisting peer criticism and lacking any record of self-correction. Like the boundary between a hill and a mountain, the boundary is fuzzy, but the clear cases on either side are real.
The value-free ideal
A second debate concerns objectivity. Through much of the twentieth century many scientists and philosophers held a value-free ideal. Values obviously shape which questions get studied and how results are used. But on the value-free ideal, moral and political values should play no part in judging whether evidence supports a claim. Philosophers distinguish epistemic values, such as accuracy and simplicity, which bear on truth, from non-epistemic values, such as profit, justice or national pride, which do not. The ideal says only the first kind belongs in the assessment of evidence.
Critics have challenged the ideal from several directions. One argument holds that deciding how much evidence is enough depends on the cost of being wrong, which is a value judgment. Another comes from feminist philosophy of science, which collected cases where background assumptions about sex and gender slipped into research unnoticed. The anthropologist Emily Martin showed in 1991 that textbooks described egg and sperm using gender stereotypes: the sperm as an active hero penetrating a passive egg, even after research had shown that the egg plays an active role in fertilization.
Objectivity as a social achievement
The American philosopher Helen Longino drew a constructive conclusion in 1990. Since evidence supports hypotheses only against background assumptions, and individuals cannot easily see their own assumptions, objectivity cannot be a feature of lone scientists. On her view, objectivity is a property of communities that practise organized criticism. A community is more objective the better it meets four conditions: there are recognized venues for criticism; criticism is actually taken up and can change minds; there are shared public standards for judging claims; and there is tempered equality of intellectual authority, meaning that qualified people are heard whatever their sex, race or rank. Longino's view connects objectivity to equal standing: excluding people from the conversation does not just wrong them, it makes the science worse, because it removes the critics most likely to spot an assumption the rest share. Critics worry that letting values in, even with good intentions, invites politics to bend findings. Defenders reply that values are already present, and that bringing them into the open lets them be criticized.
Worked example: creation science on trial
In 1981 Arkansas passed a law requiring public schools that taught evolution to give balanced treatment to "creation science," which held that the Earth is young and that a worldwide flood shaped its geology. Parents and religious leaders sued. In McLean v. Arkansas, decided in January 1982, Judge William Overton struck the law down. Drawing on testimony from the philosopher Michael Ruse, he listed features of science: it is guided by natural law, explains by reference to natural law, is testable against the empirical world, holds its conclusions tentatively and is falsifiable. Creation science, he found, met none of them. Laudan criticized the ruling, though not its outcome. Creation science, he pointed out, makes testable claims about the age of the Earth and the flood, and those claims have been tested and refuted. The honest verdict, he argued, is that it is false, not that it is unscientific, and a court that relies on a shaky criterion invites trouble later. Ruse replied that the law needed a usable line. The episode shows the demarcation problem at work: everyone agreed the teaching was poor science; they disagreed about the best reason to say so.
