Skip to main content

Through the 1920s a discussion group met regularly in Vienna around the philosopher and physicist Moritz Schlick. Its members included the logician Rudolf Carnap and the social reformer Otto Neurath, and a young Kurt Gödel sometimes sat in. They had watched Einstein overturn ideas about space and time that philosophers had called certain. They concluded that philosophy needed cleaning out. In 1929 they published a manifesto, The Scientific Conception of the World, announcing a unified science built on experience and logic, with no room left for speculation about hidden realities. They became known as the Vienna Circle, and their outlook as logical positivism or logical empiricism.

The verification principle

Their sharpest tool was a test of meaning. On the verification principle, a statement is meaningful only if it is true by definition or could in principle be checked by experience. "All bachelors are unmarried" passes the first way; "there is copper under this hill" passes the second. A statement that passes neither test is not false. It says nothing at all.

The consequence was dramatic. Claims such as "reality is spirit" or "the soul survives death in a timeless realm" were declared not wrong but empty. On the positivist view, metaphysical claims are meaningless rather than merely false, because no possible observation bears on them. Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus of 1921, which the Circle read line by line, ended with a sentence they admired: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." Ethics fared little better. Many positivists held that moral statements express feelings or attitudes rather than facts, so "stealing is wrong" works more like a disapproving tone of voice than like a report.

The program reached English readers through a young Oxford philosopher. Alfred Jules Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic, published in 1936, stated the doctrine with such confidence that it became a bestseller among students and a scandal among their teachers.

The trouble with the principle

The principle soon met serious objections. The first was close to home: the principle fails its own test. It is not true by definition, and no observation could verify it, so by its own standard it should be meaningless. Defenders called it a proposal about language, which made it look like a choice rather than a discovery.

The second objection struck at science itself. If meaningful claims must be conclusively verifiable, then universal laws such as "all metals expand when heated" cannot be conclusively verified, since no finite number of observations covers every case. A test of meaning designed to protect science seemed to condemn its laws. Weaker versions asked only that experience could count for or against a statement. These let in too much. When Ayer offered a careful revised criterion in 1946, the logician Alonzo Church showed in 1949 that it would count almost any statement as meaningful. Repair after repair met the same fate: each version was either too strict or too loose.

A boat with no dry dock

The Circle also argued among themselves about foundations. Schlick wanted knowledge to rest on direct reports of experience. Neurath doubted that any statement was beyond revision, and offered an image that outlived the movement. In an essay of 1932 he compared inquirers to sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open sea, replacing one plank at a time, never able to bring it into dry dock and start fresh. The point of Neurath's boat is that knowledge is rebuilt piece by piece, with no fixed foundation beneath it.

Exile and legacy

The Circle was a political target as well as a philosophical school. Several members were Jewish, many were socialists, and all were hostile to the nationalist mysticism spreading through Central Europe. In 1936 Schlick was shot dead on the steps of the University of Vienna by a former student, and parts of the local press treated the killer sympathetically. After 1938 almost every member had emigrated, chiefly to the United States and Britain, where their logical empiricism shaped a generation of philosophy of science. Late in life Ayer conceded, in substance, that most of the old doctrine had been mistaken. What survived was an ideal of clarity, an insistence that claims about the world answer to evidence, and a distinction between theory and observation that later critics would make their main target.

Worked example: are we living in a simulation?

Suppose a friend argues that the universe is a perfect computer simulation, one that reproduces every observation exactly as a real universe would. A strict positivist would reply that the claim is not false but meaningless: if no possible experience could tell the two worlds apart, there is nothing for the words to assert. Many people find that answer too quick. We seem to understand the claim well enough to argue about it, which suggests it has meaning. And the claim might not be perfectly untestable after all: some physicists have proposed looking for small irregularities that a finite computer would leave behind. The positivist test still does useful work here. It forces the friend to say what difference the hypothesis makes, and if the honest answer is "none," that is worth knowing, even if one stops short of calling the idea nonsense.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What did logical positivists say about metaphysical claims?
2. Which book brought logical positivism to English readers in 1936?
3. How did many positivists treat moral statements?
4. What is the point of Neurath's boat?
5. What did Alonzo Church show in 1949 about Ayer's revised criterion?
6. What is the self-refutation objection to the verification principle?
7. What does the verification principle say?
8. Why did strong verification seem to threaten science itself?

CivilSimian.com created by AxiomaticPanic, CivilSimian, Kalokagathia