In the autumn of 1792 a British fleet sailed for China carrying a planetarium, telescopes, a hot air balloon and a letter from King George III. The embassy of Lord Macartney hoped to change the way Britain traded with the largest empire on earth. It failed, and the reasons it failed explain much of what followed over the next seventy years.
One port, one guild
The Qing dynasty, Manchu rulers who had governed China since 1644, did not think of foreign trade as a matter between equal states. Trade was a privilege the emperor granted, to be watched closely and kept at the edge of the realm. In 1757 the Qianlong emperor confined European trade to a single port, Canton, now called Guangzhou. There a small group of licensed Chinese firms, known together as the Cohong, held the right to deal with foreigners. The Cohong merchants also stood surety for the foreigners' conduct: if a ship's crew broke the law or a duty went unpaid, the Chinese merchant answered for it. The arrangement suited the state. It made a few wealthy men responsible for everything, and the court could squeeze them for contributions whenever it needed money.
Above the merchants sat the Hoppo, the official who ran Canton's maritime customs. He was usually a Manchu appointed from the imperial household, and the post was famous for making its holders rich. Fees, gifts and charges piled on top of the official duties, and foreign traders complained that nobody would tell them what the true rates were.
Life in the factories
Ocean-going ships could not reach the city itself. They anchored at Whampoa, about a dozen miles downriver, and goods moved up and down by small boats. The foreign merchants lived and worked in a narrow strip of buildings along the riverbank outside the city walls, called the factories, from the old word for a trading agent. There were thirteen of them, flying the flags of Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United States and others. Foreigners could not enter the walled city, could not bring their wives and were not supposed to hire Chinese teachers to learn the language. The trading season ran with the monsoon winds, roughly from autumn to spring. In the off season the foreigners had to leave for Macau, the small Portuguese settlement at the mouth of the Pearl River.
The rules were tested early. In 1759 James Flint, an East India Company employee who spoke Chinese, sailed north to Tianjin to complain to the court about corruption at Canton. The emperor did order an inquiry, but Flint was jailed for three years near Macau for breaking the rules, and the Chinese man who had helped write his petition was executed.
The thirst for tea
Why did the British put up with all this? The answer was tea. In the eighteenth century tea went from a luxury to an everyday drink in Britain, and China was the only large supplier. The British government had taxed it heavily, which fed an enormous smuggling trade from the continent. The Commutation Act of 1784 cut the British duty on tea sharply, from well over 100 percent to 12.5 percent, and legal imports soared. The East India Company, which held a legal monopoly on British trade with China, came to depend on tea for much of its profit, and the British state depended on the duties.
The problem was payment. Chinese buyers wanted little that Britain made. Woolens sold poorly in the warm south, and clocks and mechanical toys found only a small market among the rich. For decades the Company paid for tea largely in silver, much of it mined in Spanish America.
Two embassies
Macartney asked the Qianlong emperor for more ports, a small island base and a resident envoy. The emperor's reply, addressed to George III, was polite and firm. He told the king that China had no need of British goods and that the existing rules would stand. Historians once read this as blind arrogance; many now see a sensible way to keep powerful foreigners in one closely watched place.
A second embassy, under Lord Amherst in 1816, went worse. Amherst was sent away without an audience because he would not perform the kowtow, the full ritual of kneeling and touching the head to the ground before the emperor. To the court, the ritual expressed the proper order of the world. To the British, it looked like an admission that their king was a vassal.
Worked example: a season at Canton
Follow one British ship through the system around 1810. It arrives in late summer and stops at Macau to take on a Chinese pilot. It then sails up to Whampoa, where customs officers measure it, and its captain pays a measurement fee and a large present to officials. A Cohong merchant agrees to act as its security, buying its cargo of woolens, raw cotton from India and some silver, and selling it tea in return. The ship's officers stay in the factories for a few months while the tea is weighed, packed and loaded. By early spring the ship heads home on the northeast monsoon. Notice where power lay: every step ran through people the Chinese state could hold responsible. For the Qing this was order. For the British traders, who could appeal to nobody above the Hoppo, it felt like dependence, and their growing frustration would soon combine with a far more dangerous trade.
