The man who toppled Díaz was an unlikely rebel. Francisco I. Madero came from one of the richest families in the northern state of Coahuila. He had studied business in France and agriculture in California. He was small, mild and devoted to spiritism, a belief that the living could communicate with spirits, and he was a vegetarian in a country of ranchers. Almost no one in power took him seriously.
A book and a slogan
In late 1908 Madero published a book, The Presidential Succession in 1910. It did not call for social revolution. It argued that Mexico's problems came from one man's unlimited power, and that the cure was free elections and an end to re-election. His Anti-Reelectionist Party campaigned under the slogan "Effective suffrage, no re-election", words that for decades afterward appeared at the foot of Mexican official documents.
Madero toured the country by train in 1909 and 1910, drawing crowds far larger than the regime expected. Faced with a real opponent, Díaz forgot what he had told Creelman. In June 1910 Madero was arrested in Monterrey and jailed in San Luis Potosí. The election went ahead, and Díaz was declared the winner by a vast margin. Released on bail but confined to the city, Madero slipped away in disguise in October and crossed into Texas.
The Plan of San Luis Potosí
From San Antonio, Madero issued a manifesto dated to his last days in San Luis Potosí. The Plan of San Luis Potosí declared the 1910 election void and called on Mexicans to rise on 20 November 1910, a date Mexico now celebrates as Revolution Day. The plan was mostly about politics, but one clause promised that lands taken unjustly from small owners, many of them indigenous, would be returned. That single promise drew many rural Mexicans to a cause that was otherwise about ballots.
The first days went badly. In Puebla the police raided the house of Aquiles Serdán, a shoemaker who had been organizing for Madero, two days before the planned rising; Serdán, his family and a few supporters fought back, and he was killed. Madero crossed the border on 20 November, found only a handful of men waiting, and went back to Texas.
The revolt catches fire in the north
Yet in the mountains of Chihuahua the rising took hold. Pascual Orozco was a muleteer who hauled goods to the mines; Francisco "Pancho" Villa, born Doroteo Arango, had spent years as a cattle thief and outlaw. They led ranchers, miners and cowboys who fought as guerrillas, striking federal columns and vanishing into the hills. Early in 1911 risings spread to other states, and in March Zapata and his neighbors took up arms in Morelos.
The decisive blow came at the border. In May 1911 Orozco and Villa captured Ciudad Juárez, across the river from El Paso, attacking against Madero's own orders because he feared shells landing in the United States. The fall of a major city convinced the regime it could not win.
The Treaty of Ciudad Juárez
The settlement signed on 21 May 1911 was a compromise. Díaz and his vice president would resign. An interim president, Francisco León de la Barra, a diplomat of the old regime, would govern until new elections. The revolutionary forces would disband. The federal army, the Congress and most state governments would stay in place. On 31 May Díaz sailed from Veracruz aboard the German steamer Ypiranga. He died in Paris in 1915.
Why did a regime of thirty five years collapse within six months? The federal army was much smaller than its paper strength and poorly trained for guerrilla war. The elite was divided, and many of Díaz's own allies were not willing to die for an old man with no clear successor. Arms flowed across the American border. And beneath the political quarrel lay decades of grievances over land, wages and local tyranny that a call to arms could suddenly release.
Worked example: the bargain of Ciudad Juárez
Was the treaty wise? Consider it as Madero did. He was a constitutionalist who believed in law, and he wanted to win power through elections rather than at gunpoint. By keeping the army and the Congress, he avoided a long war, reassured foreign governments and investors, and could claim that the revolution had restored legality rather than replaced it with force. Fewer people would die.
Now look at it as a Chihuahua rancher or a Morelos villager might. The men who had done the fighting were told to go home and hand in their rifles. The army that had shot at them would remain, under the same generals. The landowners who had taken village fields still sat in state governments and courts. Nothing in the treaty touched land at all.
Both views have force. The treaty shows a dilemma that recurs in many transitions from dictatorship: a negotiated exit can save lives and preserve institutions, but the institutions it preserves may belong to the old order. The question to ask of any such bargain is not only whether it ends the fighting, but whether it leaves the people who rose up with any real power to secure what they fought for.
