In September 1910 Mexico City glowed with new electric lights. The government of Porfirio Díaz was celebrating one hundred years since the first rising for independence, and foreign guests admired new avenues, a column topped by a golden angel, and a capital eager to resemble Paris. Ten weeks later the country was in revolt. To understand why, it helps to begin with the regime that threw the party.
How Díaz took and kept power
Díaz was a general from Oaxaca who had fought bravely against the French occupation of the 1860s. He came to power in 1876 through a revolt called the Plan of Tuxtepec, which, with heavy irony, promised that no president would be re-elected. He stepped aside from 1880 to 1884 for an ally, Manuel González, then returned and had the constitution amended so that he could be re-elected again and again. Historians call his long rule the Porfiriato.
His method is often summed up in a saying attributed to him, "bread or the stick." Loyal governors, generals and local bosses received offices, contracts and land. Rivals were bought off, sent abroad or crushed. In the countryside order was kept by the rurales, a mounted rural police force with a reputation for shooting prisoners "while trying to escape." Elections took place on schedule, but their results were settled in advance. Newspapers that criticized the president were fined or closed.
Order and progress
Around Díaz gathered a circle of advisers known as the científicos, the scientists. Influenced by the positivism of Auguste Comte, the científicos believed a nation should be governed by experts applying scientific method rather than by the passions of politics. Their finance minister, José Yves Limantour, balanced the budget in the 1890s and restored Mexico's credit abroad.
The results were striking. Mexico's railways grew from about 640 kilometers in 1876 to nearly 20,000 by 1910, built largely with American and British money. Exports of silver, copper, henequen fiber for binder twine, coffee and rubber soared, and after 1900 foreign companies began drilling for oil along the Gulf coast. Much of this new wealth belonged to foreigners, who owned most of the mines and oil fields.
Who paid for progress
The cost fell above all on rural people. A liberal law of 1856, the Lerdo Law, had forbidden corporations from holding land, a measure aimed at the Church that also struck at indigenous villages, which held fields and woods in common. Survey companies were paid in land for mapping supposedly vacant public lands, and they often swallowed village fields whose owners had no modern titles. By 1910, on many estimates, the great majority of rural families owned no land at all.
Many worked on haciendas, vast private estates. On some estates workers were bound by debts, often run up at the hacienda's own store, debts that passed from parents to children. When the Yaqui people of Sonora resisted the loss of their river valley, thousands of Yaqui were deported to the henequen plantations of Yucatán, where many died.
Industrial workers protested too. In 1906 miners at the American-owned copper mine at Cananea, in Sonora, struck because Mexicans earned less than Americans for the same work. Armed volunteers from Arizona crossed the border to help put down the strike. In January 1907 troops fired on textile workers at Río Blanco in Veracruz, killing dozens or more. A small opposition, led by the brothers Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magón, published the newspaper Regeneración from exile in the United States. Their Mexican Liberal Party's program of 1906 called for an eight hour day, an end to re-election and land for those who worked it.
An aging regime
By 1908 Díaz was 77 and many of his ministers and governors were nearly as old. That year he gave an interview to the American journalist James Creelman, published in Pearson's Magazine. In it Díaz said that Mexico was ready for democracy and that he would welcome an opposition party. Mexicans took it as permission. Meanwhile an American financial panic in 1907 and poor harvests brought layoffs and rising food prices.
Worked example: a village in Morelos
Take Anenecuilco, a small village in the state of Morelos, just south of Mexico City. As railways and new machinery made larger mills profitable, the sugar haciendas of Morelos expanded, absorbing village fields, pastures and, most painfully, irrigation water. Anenecuilco kept land titles from the colonial era in a strongbox and fought the haciendas in court for decades, usually losing. In 1909 the villagers chose a young horse trainer and small farmer, Emiliano Zapata, to head their council and guard the papers.
Now compare two ways of describing the same years. A report from Mexico City could point to rising sugar output, new mills, modern rail links and growing tax revenue, all of it true. The view from Anenecuilco was a village losing the means to feed itself, with every legal door closed. The lesson for any student of development is to ask who counts as the nation when a government reports national progress. A regime that treats a village of farmers as an obstacle to be cleared, rather than as citizens with claims of their own, may grow quickly and still be building the conditions for its own collapse.
