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Two sources of knowledge

Kant divided the mind's work between two powers. Sensibility receives: it is the capacity to be affected by things, and what it delivers Kant called intuitions, the raw presence of something given. Understanding thinks: it organizes what is given by means of concepts. Neither power can do the other's job. In J. M. D. Meiklejohn's 1855 translation the famous line runs: "Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind." Thoughts without content are empty, with nothing to be about; intuitions without concepts are a blur, recognized as nothing in particular. Knowledge needs both.

Rationalists had trusted concepts alone, empiricists sensations alone; each, Kant thought, had half the truth.

Space and time

The first part of the Critique, which Kant called the Transcendental Aesthetic (using "aesthetic" in its old sense of sensation), makes a bold claim. Space and time are not things, and they are not properties of things as they are in themselves. They are forms of our sensible intuition: the frame in which anything at all can appear to us.

Kant gave several arguments. We can imagine space with nothing in it, but we cannot imagine an object that is not in space. Above all, geometry gives us necessary truths about space that we know without measuring every triangle. If space were a feature of things wholly independent of us, that kind of advance knowledge would be a mystery. If space is the form of our own outer experience, it is not mysterious at all: whatever we meet will obey geometry, because it can only be met in space.

The categories

Understanding also contributes. To turn a stream of intuitions into experience of objects, it applies a set of pure concepts that Kant called the categories. He arranged them as twelve categories in four groups of three: quantity, quality, relation and modality. Under relation he placed cause and effect, along with substance and community. In the book's hardest section he argued that these concepts must apply to every object we can experience, because without them there would be no experience of objects at all.

This is Kant's reply to Hume: causation is not read off the world by habit but is one of the rules by which a world of objects is put together in experience.

The I that thinks

What holds all of this together? Kant's answer was the unity of self-consciousness, which he called the transcendental unity of apperception. Every one of my representations must be able to carry the tag "I think," or it would not be mine. A single, continuing point of view is what lets the perceptions of a morning add up to one experience rather than a heap of flashes.

This unity is a formal condition of thinking, not knowledge of a soul. It tells us that experience must belong to a subject; it does not tell us that the subject is a simple, immortal substance.

Appearances and things in themselves

The solution has a price. We can know a priori only the forms the mind contributes, so what we know are objects as they appear to beings like us, which Kant called phenomena. Things as they are in themselves, apart from our forms of experience, can be thought but never known. Kant called his position transcendental idealism.

He insisted it was also an empirical realism: things in space are fully real, not dreams. Tables, planets and other people are not private images; they are public objects that science studies with full right. What is ideal is only the framework, not the furniture.

Readers still argue whether Kant meant two worlds or two ways of considering the same things. And from the start critics pressed a sharp objection: Kant says things in themselves affect us, yet he limits cause to appearances. How can something we may not even call a cause produce our sensations?

Worked example: the green spectacles

In March 1801 the young playwright Heinrich von Kleist wrote to his fiancée in despair after reading Kant. If everyone wore green glass instead of eyes, he reasoned, they would judge all things green and could never tell whether the green belonged to the things or to the glass. So, he concluded, we can never know whether what we call truth is really true.

Kleist captured something real: there is no stepping outside our own forms of experience to compare them with things in themselves. But it misleads in three ways a careful Kantian would point out.

First, glasses can be taken off, which is why we can imagine an unfiltered view. Space and time cannot be removed; there is no "real color" behind them waiting to be seen by a better eye. Second, green glass distorts what would otherwise appear differently, while Kant's forms do not distort. They are the conditions of anything appearing at all. Third, Kleist slid from "we cannot know things in themselves" to "we cannot know what is true." For Kant, the truths of geometry, physics and everyday life are fully objective within experience, because every human knower shares the same forms.

Kant's limits on knowledge are not a counsel of despair. They mark the ground on which science stands firm.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What did Kant say thoughts without content are?
2. What are space and time, according to Kant?
3. How did Kant arrange his pure concepts of the understanding?
4. Under which heading did Kant place cause and effect?
5. What ties a person's perceptions together into one experience, for Kant?
6. What can we know a priori about objects, on Kant's view?
7. What did Kant mean by calling his view an empirical realism?
8. Which objection did early critics raise against Kant's things in themselves?

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