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On 2 December 1956 an overloaded yacht called the Granma ran aground in a mangrove swamp on Cuba's southeastern coast. It carried 82 men who had sailed from Mexico a week earlier. Their landing had been timed to match an uprising in Santiago led by Frank País, but they arrived two days late, after the rising had been crushed. Three days later army troops surprised them at Alegría de Pío and scattered them. Only a small band of survivors, perhaps twenty, including Fidel and Raúl Castro and Che Guevara, eventually regrouped in the Sierra Maestra mountains.

The mountains

The guerrillas survived because the peasants of the Sierra fed and guided them. Many were squatters who had been threatened with eviction by landowners and abused by the Rural Guard. The rebels paid for food, punished their own men for theft, and executed informers and bandits, which built a reputation for order.

Publicity mattered as much as rifles. In February 1957 Herbert Matthews of the New York Times was led into the mountains to interview Castro. The government had claimed Castro was dead, and Matthews's articles showed that Castro was alive and fighting. They made him famous abroad, though Matthews greatly overestimated the size of his force.

The cities

Most of the danger, and much of the work, fell on the urban underground, which members called the llano, the plain, as opposed to the sierra. It raised money, smuggled weapons, printed propaganda, set bombs and recruited fighters. Its leader, Frank País, was only twenty two when police killed him in Santiago in July 1957; a spontaneous strike shut down the city after his death. Women played central roles. Celia Sánchez organized the rebels' supply network in the Sierra and became Castro's closest aide, while Vilma Espín and Haydée Santamaría helped run the movement's clandestine work.

Other groups fought too. On 13 March 1957 the student Directorio Revolucionario attacked the Presidential Palace in Havana, trying to kill Batista. The attack failed, and the student leader José Antonio Echeverría was shot dead the same day near the university. The Communist party, by contrast, at first condemned the armed groups as reckless and joined the fight only in 1958. Batista's police answered all of them with torture and killings, leaving bodies in the streets as warnings. The brutality turned much of the middle class and the Catholic Church against the regime.

The turn of 1958

Batista's foreign support weakened as well. In March 1958 the United States suspended arms shipments to Batista, a sign that Washington no longer trusted him to restore order. Yet the rebels suffered their own defeat in April, when a general strike called by the July 26 Movement failed. The failure discredited the urban leaders and shifted authority within the movement to Castro and the guerrillas in the mountains.

In the summer Batista launched a major offensive, sending more than ten thousand soldiers into the Sierra. Badly led and poorly motivated, the troops were drawn into ambushes, and by August the offensive had failed against a few hundred rebels. Columns led by Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos then marched west to the central province of Las Villas. In late December, Guevara's forces derailed an armored train and took the city of Santa Clara. In the early hours of 1 January 1959 Batista fled to the Dominican Republic. When generals tried to form a junta, a general strike called by Castro blocked them.

How many people died in the insurrection is uncertain. The new government cited a figure of twenty thousand victims of Batista, which most historians regard as far too high; careful estimates are a few thousand, which is still a heavy toll for a country of six million.

Worked example: how did a few hundred beat an army?

At the end of 1958 the rebel army counted perhaps three thousand fighters, while Batista's forces numbered in the tens of thousands. How did the smaller side win? Three explanations compete.

The first, which Guevara later turned into a theory, says that a small armed band in the countryside can create the conditions for revolution by its own example, without waiting for a mass movement. The second stresses the collapse of the regime: an army hollowed out by corruption and promotion through loyalty, a dictator losing American support, and a population that would not defend him. The third points to a broad coalition, in which the guerrillas were one part alongside the urban underground, the students, professional groups and the Church.

The evidence favors a combination of the second and third. The guerrillas mattered, especially as a symbol that could not be destroyed, but they rarely fought large battles, and many of the movement's dead fell in the cities. This matters because the first explanation became a legend that the new government taught, and it had consequences. In the 1960s guerrilla bands across Latin America tried to repeat the Sierra Maestra without its special conditions, and most were wiped out, Guevara's own in Bolivia among them. The habit worth keeping is to notice who tells a victory's story and which partners drop out of it.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. How many men sailed on the Granma from Mexico?
2. What did Herbert Matthews's 1957 articles show?
3. What happened to Frank País in July 1957?
4. Who attacked the Presidential Palace on 13 March 1957?
5. What did the United States do in March 1958?
6. What was the result of Batista's summer offensive of 1958?
7. What did Guevara's forces do at Santa Clara?
8. What role did Celia Sánchez play in the insurrection?

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