Hitler did not seize power. He was handed it, by men who believed they could use him. The last months of the republic are among the most closely studied in modern history, because so much turned on the choices of a handful of people, and because the result was a regime that would go on to kill millions.
The Nazi high tide
In the election of July 1932 the Nazis won 230 seats and became by far the largest party. Together the Nazis and the Communists held a majority of seats, so no government could command a majority without one of the two parties that wanted to destroy the republic. In September the Reichstag voted no confidence in Papen by 512 votes to 42, and new elections followed. In November 1932 the Nazis lost about two million votes and fell to 196 seats. Some observers believed its moment had passed.
Intrigue at the top
In December Schleicher replaced Papen as chancellor. He tried to split the Nazis by offering a post to Gregor Strasser, a leader of the party's more socially minded wing, and to win over the unions. Strasser resigned his party offices instead, and the unions distrusted the general. Meanwhile Papen, eager for revenge on Schleicher, met Hitler secretly at the Cologne home of the banker Kurt von Schröder on 4 January 1933 and began to negotiate a new government. When Schleicher asked for the power to dissolve the Reichstag and postpone elections, Hindenburg refused, and Schleicher resigned.
On 30 January Hindenburg appointed the new cabinet. Only three of its members were Nazis: Hitler, Wilhelm Frick as interior minister and Hermann Göring, who also took charge of the Prussian police. Papen became vice chancellor, and conservatives held most other posts. They believed they had hired Hitler for his mass following while keeping real power for themselves.
From chancellor to dictator
The conservatives' plan collapsed within weeks. On the night of 27 February the Reichstag building burned, and a young Dutch Communist, Marinus van der Lubbe, was arrested at the scene. Historians still debate whether he acted alone, but the regime's response was swift. The Reichstag Fire Decree of 28 February, issued under Article 48, suspended basic rights such as free speech, free assembly and the privacy of mail, with no end date. Thousands of Communists and Social Democrats were arrested. In the election of 5 March, held amid terror, the Nazis won about 44 percent, still short of a majority on their own.
On 23 March, meeting in a Berlin opera house with SA men lining the hall, the Reichstag voted on the Enabling Act, which let the cabinet make laws without the Reichstag, even laws departing from the constitution, for four years. The Communist deputies had been arrested or driven into hiding. The Centre Party voted yes after promises from Hitler that were soon broken. The Social Democrats were the only party to vote against, and their leader Otto Wels told the chamber that his party might lose its freedom and even its members' lives, but would keep its honor. The act passed by 444 votes to 94. By July 1933 every other party had been banned or had dissolved itself, and the Nazi party was the only legal one.
Why did the republic fail?
Historians offer several kinds of answer, and most now combine them. One stresses burdens: defeat, Versailles, the inflation and the Depression loaded a young democracy with more than almost any could bear. A second points to institutions, especially proportional representation and the president's emergency powers. A third stresses people: the army, the courts, the civil service and the landowning elite never accepted the republic, which is why it is often called a republic without republicans. The political scientist Karl Dietrich Bracher described the final years as a power vacuum that conservative elites filled with their own schemes. Henry Ashby Turner argued that Hitler's appointment was not inevitable at all, but the outcome of a few weeks of intrigue that could easily have gone differently. Studies of voters by Jürgen Falter found that the Nazis drew support from every social class, though Protestants and rural voters backed them far more than Catholics did.
Worked example: Bonn is not Weimar
When West Germans wrote a new constitution, the Basic Law of 1949, they studied Weimar's failure closely. Its first article declares human dignity inviolable and binds all state power to respect and protect it. The president lost the power to rule by decree and is chosen by a special assembly rather than by popular vote. A chancellor can be removed only when parliament elects a successor at the same time. A 5 percent threshold, applied nationwide from 1953, keeps very small parties out of parliament. The constitutional court can ban parties that aim to abolish the democratic order, and the core principles of dignity and democracy can never be amended away. The approach became known as militant democracy: a democracy that refuses to hand its enemies the means to destroy it. Critics worry that such powers could be turned against legitimate dissent. Yet the stability of postwar Germany, summed up in the phrase "Bonn is not Weimar," suggests that institutions shaped by hard lessons can help, as long as citizens and leaders still choose to defend them.
