The world slump reached Germany early and hit it hard. American loans dried up, exports fell, and by early 1932 about six million Germans were registered as unemployed, close to a third of all wage earners. Yet economic misery alone did not end democracy. What turned a crisis into a collapse was a series of political decisions, many of them made by a small circle of men around an aging president.
The end of parliamentary government
The last cabinet with a majority in the Reichstag fell in March 1930. Hermann Müller's grand coalition broke apart in a dispute over unemployment insurance. With claims soaring, the Social Democrats refused to cut benefits and the business-friendly DVP refused to raise employers' contributions, though the gap between them came to about half a percentage point of wages. Hindenburg's advisers, above all General Kurt von Schleicher, had already prepared an alternative. Hindenburg appointed the Centre politician Heinrich Brüning to lead what historians call a presidential cabinet, a government that relied on the president rather than on a majority in parliament.
When the Reichstag voted in July 1930 to overturn Brüning's decrees, he dissolved it. The election that September was a political earthquake: the Nazis became the second largest party, and the Communists gained as well. Brüning now had even less hope of a majority. The Social Democrats decided to tolerate Brüning, declining to vote him down, because they feared new elections would only strengthen the Nazis, and because they wanted to protect the SPD-led government of Prussia, in which Brüning's Centre Party was a partner.
Parliament fades
The numbers tell the story. In 1930 the Reichstag passed 98 laws and the president issued 5 emergency decrees. In 1932 the Reichstag passed only 5 laws, while the president issued 66 decrees. Brüning's harsh cuts in spending, aimed at balancing the budget and proving that Germany could not pay reparations, deepened the slump. In July 1931 one of the country's largest banks failed, forcing a bank holiday and strict controls on foreign exchange. Reparations were effectively ended at the Lausanne conference in the summer of 1932, too late to help Brüning.
Violence returned to the streets. The Nazi storm troopers, the SA, grew to hundreds of thousands of members. They fought Communist fighting groups and the Reichsbanner, a veterans' league organized mainly by Social Democrats to defend the constitution. In the summer of 1932, street battles killed scores of people within a few weeks.
Hindenburg re-elected
Hindenburg's term ran out in 1932. In a strange reversal of 1925, the Social Democrats and the Centre backed Hindenburg as the only candidate who could beat Hitler. In the April runoff he won about 53 percent, against about 37 percent for Hitler and 10 percent for Thälmann. Days later, Brüning's government banned the SA and the SS. But Hindenburg felt little gratitude to the parties that had re-elected him and resented owing his victory to Catholics and socialists. Schleicher, who now wanted to draw the Nazis into government, turned against the ban, and Hindenburg's landowning friends denounced a plan to settle unemployed workers on bankrupt eastern estates as agrarian Bolshevism. At the end of May 1932 Hindenburg forced Brüning out, even though he had not lost a vote in the Reichstag.
Papen and the Prussian coup
The new chancellor, Franz von Papen, was a Catholic aristocrat with almost no support in the Reichstag. His cabinet, dominated by nobles, was nicknamed the cabinet of barons. To win Nazi tolerance he lifted the ban on the SA and called new elections. Then, on 20 July 1932, citing a deadly street battle in Altona three days earlier, Papen used an emergency decree to remove the government of Prussia and made himself Reich commissioner for the state. That government had lost its majority in a state election in April and was serving as a caretaker, but it still controlled the largest police force in Germany. The Social Democrats and unions protested in court but did not call a general strike as they had in 1920. With six million unemployed, they judged that a strike would fail and that resistance might mean civil war against the army.
Worked example: was toleration a mistake?
Critics argue that the SPD's decision to tolerate Brüning, and then not to resist Papen's coup, taught the republic's enemies that democrats would not fight. By accepting rule by decree as a lesser evil, Social Democrats helped make it normal, and when the moment of real danger arrived they had already given up the tools of parliament and the street.
Defenders answer that every alternative looked worse. Bringing Brüning down would have meant elections that strengthened the Nazis, and a general strike in 1932 had little chance with millions out of work and a hostile army. The party hoped to wait until the economy recovered. Both sides of the argument point to the same structural fact: once parliament could not form a majority, the fate of German democracy rested with the president and his circle. Toleration was a bet that Hindenburg would stay loyal to the constitution, and it was a bet that lost. The case shows how a series of defensible lesser evils can, step by step, hand power to people who do not believe in the rules.
