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Richard Nixon came to office determined to end American involvement without appearing to lose. His national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, shared his view that a humiliating exit would damage American credibility around the world. Their approach combined three tracks: withdrawing American troops, strengthening South Vietnam to fight on its own, and using force and diplomacy to press Hanoi into a settlement.

Vietnamization

American troop strength peaked at about 543,000 in the spring of 1969. That summer Nixon announced the first withdrawals and set out what became known as the Nixon Doctrine: the United States would help allies defend themselves but expect them to supply the soldiers. Vietnamization meant handing the ground war to South Vietnam's own forces while American troops went home. The southern army grew to around a million men. Under General Creighton Abrams, who succeeded Westmoreland, American forces put more weight on securing villages. Some historians, notably Lewis Sorley, argue that this approach was working by the early 1970s and that the war was lost later through lack of support; others reply that the southern state's political weaknesses remained untouched.

Widening the war

To protect the withdrawal, Nixon struck at communist bases across the borders. From March 1969 American bombers secretly attacked sanctuaries in Cambodia. In April 1970 American and South Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia, setting off new protests at home. At Kent State University in May 1970, National Guardsmen fired on students and killed four, and days later police killed two students at Jackson State College in Mississippi. In 1971 a South Vietnamese drive into Laos, meant to cut the trail, ended in a costly retreat. The fighting and bombing in Cambodia also helped destabilize that country and strengthened the Khmer Rouge, though historians disagree about how much.

The Pentagon Papers

In June 1971 the New York Times began publishing a secret Defense Department history of American decision making in Vietnam, commissioned by McNamara in 1967. The Pentagon Papers were leaked by Daniel Ellsberg, a former defense analyst who had worked on the study. They showed that successive administrations had widened the war while telling the public less than they knew. The Nixon administration went to court to stop publication. Later that month the Supreme Court ruled that the newspapers could keep publishing, holding that the government had not justified prior restraint.

The Easter Offensive

In March 1972 Hanoi launched its largest attack yet, a conventional invasion with tanks and artillery across the demilitarized zone and from Laos and Cambodia. South Vietnamese forces, backed by massive American air power, held off the 1972 Easter Offensive, though they lost ground. The offensive suggested both that Vietnamization could work with American air support and that it might fail without it.

The Paris Accords

Kissinger and the North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho reached a draft deal in October 1972, but South Vietnam's president, Nguyen Van Thieu, rejected it because it allowed northern troops to remain in the south. In December Nixon ordered the most intense bombing of the war against Hanoi and Haiphong, known as the Christmas bombing, while privately promising Thieu American support if Hanoi broke the deal. The Paris Peace Accords of January 1973 allowed North Vietnamese troops to remain in the south, much as the October draft had. American forces left within two months, and nearly six hundred American prisoners of war came home. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, but Le Duc Tho declined the Nobel Peace Prize, saying peace had not yet been achieved. Congress, wary of new commitments, soon barred funds for further American combat in Indochina and passed the War Powers Resolution over Nixon's veto.

Worked example: the Pentagon Papers and the right to know

The Pentagon Papers case set two things democracies value against each other. The government argued that publishing secret documents in wartime could endanger diplomacy, soldiers and intelligence sources, and that officials, not newspapers, should decide what must stay secret. The newspapers argued that the documents concerned past decisions, that citizens needed to know how their leaders had taken them into war, and that the First Amendment forbade the government from stopping publication in advance.

The Court's decision was narrow. It did not say that leaking secrets was legal, and Ellsberg was charged under the Espionage Act. His case was dismissed in 1973 after it emerged that a White House team had broken into his psychiatrist's office looking for damaging information about him, one of the abuses that fed into the Watergate scandal. A historian weighing the episode might ask whether publication actually harmed security. Later assessments, including one by the government's own chief lawyer in the case, found little sign that it did; the documents mostly embarrassed earlier administrations. That suggests a lesson about secrecy: governments tend to classify material that would expose their own mistakes, not only material that would help an enemy. A free people needs ways to learn the truth about decisions made in its name, and ways to protect secrets that genuinely matter. The case shows how hard it is to have both.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What did Vietnamization mean?
2. What did American and South Vietnamese troops do in April 1970?
3. What happened at Kent State University in May 1970?
4. Who leaked the Pentagon Papers?
5. What did the Supreme Court rule about the Pentagon Papers in June 1971?
6. What was the outcome of Hanoi's Easter Offensive of 1972?
7. What did the Paris Peace Accords of January 1973 allow?
8. What did Le Duc Tho do when awarded the Nobel Peace Prize?

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