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While Rawls and Scanlon developed the contract in a Kantian direction, other philosophers went back to Hobbes. They had a new tool he lacked: game theory, the mathematical study of strategic choice. With it they asked an old question more precisely. Can self-interested people, with no prior moral commitments, reason their way into rules that bind them?

Hobbes as a game

In 1950 two researchers at the RAND Corporation, Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher, devised a game that the mathematician Albert Tucker soon dressed up as a story about two prisoners. Each prisoner can stay silent or betray the other. Whatever the other does, betraying pays better; yet if both betray, both end up worse off than if both had stayed silent. In a prisoner's dilemma, each player does better by defecting whatever the other does, yet mutual defection leaves both worse off. Many readers saw Hobbes's state of nature in it. Each family in a lawless valley gains by striking first, and all suffer when everyone does.

Rousseau's hunters

Rousseau had offered a different picture in his Discourse on Inequality. "If a deer was to be taken, every one saw that, in order to succeed, he must abide faithfully by his post: but if a hare happened to come within the reach of any one of them, it is not to be doubted that he pursued it without scruple." The philosopher Brian Skyrms made this stag hunt the center of his work on the evolution of the social contract. Here the best outcome for each hunter is that everyone hunts the deer together. In a stag hunt, cooperation pays best if others cooperate, so the problem is trust, not temptation. The hare is a safe, small prize for someone who doubts the others will hold their posts. Many real cooperation problems look more like the stag hunt than the prisoner's dilemma, which makes them easier to solve: what people need is assurance.

Morals by agreement

The most ambitious attempt to build morality from self-interest came from the Canadian philosopher David Gauthier in Morals by Agreement (1986). Gauthier argued that morality can be derived as a rational constraint on the pursuit of one's own interest. He compared two kinds of agent. A straightforward maximizer always takes whatever action pays best at the moment. A constrained maximizer is disposed to cooperate with others who are similarly disposed, even when breaking the agreement would pay more in the moment. Gauthier's constrained maximizer cooperates with others similarly disposed, even when defecting would pay more at that moment.

Why would that be rational? Because of what Gauthier called translucency. People are neither fully transparent nor fully opaque; others can often tell, imperfectly, what kind of person they are dealing with. Translucency means that our dispositions are partly visible to others, so trustworthy people get invited into cooperation. The straightforward maximizer, recognized for what he is, gets left out. That is Gauthier's answer to Hobbes's Fool, the character in Leviathan who asks why he should not break faith when it pays. The Fool gains once and loses every partnership after.

A fair starting point

Bargaining from where people happen to stand can reward theft and coercion. If I enslaved you yesterday, your agreeing with me today is no moral achievement. Gauthier therefore borrowed and reworked Locke's limit on appropriation. Gauthier's version of the Lockean proviso forbids bettering one's own position by worsening another's. The bargaining begins only from positions acquired without taking advantage of others.

Fair criticism

Defenders praise the approach for its honesty. It asks for no shared religion and no metaphysics, only the interests people already have, which suits a diverse society. Critics raise three problems. First, critics charge that bargaining from existing positions lets the already powerful extract better terms, since those who can threaten more can demand more. Second, those who cannot contribute much, such as people with severe disabilities, seem to fall outside a morality built on mutual advantage, a consequence Gauthier himself admitted. Third, it is unclear whether a rule kept only because it pays is morality at all, or simply prudence wearing a moral coat.

Worked example: the night watch

A neighborhood suffers a run of burglaries. Residents propose a rota: each household takes one night a month walking the streets. If nearly everyone joins, burglaries fall and every household benefits. If only a few join, those few lose sleep for nothing.

This is a stag hunt. Each resident's best choice is to join if others will, so the task is to build assurance: a public sign-up sheet, a short first trial, a visible schedule. Now add a temptation. Once the watch works, some households start skipping their nights, enjoying safety while others walk. That part looks like a prisoner's dilemma. Gauthier's ideas suggest the remedy. Neighbors notice who turns up, and the reliable ones start sharing other favors, lending tools and minding children, with each other. Translucency rewards the constrained maximizers. But note the critic's worry too: an elderly resident who cannot walk the streets at night contributes nothing to this scheme, and a morality based only on mutual advantage struggles to explain why her house deserves protection.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What defines a prisoner's dilemma?
2. In a stag hunt, what is the main obstacle to cooperation?
3. What did Gauthier argue in Morals by Agreement?
4. How does Gauthier's constrained maximizer behave?
5. What did Gauthier mean by translucency?
6. How does Gauthier's version of the Lockean proviso limit bargaining?
7. Whom did Gauthier's idea of translucency answer?
8. What is one criticism of bargaining from existing positions?

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