Michel Foucault (1926 to 1984) wrote histories that read like accusations. His subjects were the asylum, the clinic, the prison and sexuality, and his method was to show that the categories we use to sort people, sane and mad, healthy and sick, normal and deviant, have histories that could have gone otherwise. From 1970 he held a chair at the Collège de France with a title he chose himself: the History of Systems of Thought.
Madness and reason
In his History of Madness (1961), Foucault described what he called a great confinement. In 1656 Paris founded the General Hospital, which locked up beggars, vagrants, the idle and the insane together. Around 1800 reformers such as Philippe Pinel in France and the Quaker William Tuke in England were praised for freeing the mad from chains. Foucault saw something less heroic: physical restraint replaced by constant moral supervision, a gentler but deeper form of control. Foucault argued that what counts as madness, and how it is treated, has changed with each era's idea of reason. Historians have since challenged his evidence, noting that confinement was patchier outside France than he suggested, but the question he raised has lasted.
The rules beneath knowledge
The Order of Things (1966) opens with laughter. Foucault quotes a story by the Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges about an imaginary Chinese encyclopedia that sorts animals into those belonging to the emperor, those drawn with a very fine brush, those that from a long way off look like flies, and so on. The list shows, by contrast, the limits of our own way of ordering things. Foucault called the set of unspoken rules that decide what can count as knowledge in an era an episteme. He ended the book with a striking image, here paraphrased: the figure of "man" as an object of study is a recent invention, and it might be erased like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.
Genealogy
In the 1970s Foucault adopted a method he took from Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals (1887). Genealogy traces how practices and ideas that seem natural arose from accidents, struggles and contingent histories. A genealogy does not look for a noble origin. It looks for the moment when something we now take for granted was invented, often for reasons nobody would now defend. The aim is freedom: what was made can be unmade.
Power that produces
The usual picture of power is a ruler who forbids. Foucault thought this picture captured only a fraction of modern life. Foucault argued that power is not only repressive but productive: it creates categories, identities, habits and knowledge. Experts do not merely discover kinds of people. Their records and examinations help bring those kinds into being, and the knowledge they gather gives them power over the people classified. Foucault wrote of power and knowledge as two sides of one process. He held that power circulates through networks of relations rather than being possessed by one ruler, and he insisted that wherever power operates, resistance appears with it.
The repressive hypothesis
The first volume of The History of Sexuality (1976) took aim at a story most readers believed. The Victorians, it said, silenced sex, and the twentieth century bravely liberated it. Foucault called this the repressive hypothesis and turned it upside down. From the eighteenth century onward, he argued, Europe produced an explosion of talk about sex, in confession, medicine, psychiatry, schooling and law, which named and classified dozens of new types of person. Foucault rejected the repressive hypothesis, arguing that modern societies multiplied talk about sex rather than silencing it.
Power over life
The same book closed with a historical contrast. Old sovereigns showed their power by the right to take life. Modern states show it by managing life: birth rates, public hygiene, diet, life expectancy. Biopower is Foucault's name for power that manages the life of whole populations, through statistics, averages and norms. Under biopower the key line is no longer between permitted and forbidden but between normal and abnormal.
Uses and limits
Foucault was also an activist. In 1971 he cofounded the Prison Information Group, which gathered testimony from prisoners and published it so that inmates could speak for themselves. His books have given tools to prison reformers, disability advocates and gay rights campaigners. Critics ask whether his picture of power leaves any ground to stand on when condemning abuse, a charge he answered late in life by saying, in effect, that he never claimed everything was bad, only that nothing is free of danger.
Worked example: the body mass index
In the 1830s the Belgian statistician Adolphe Quetelet, searching for the "average man," devised a ratio of weight to the square of height. The American physiologist Ancel Keys renamed it the body mass index in 1972. In 1998 United States health guidelines lowered the threshold for "overweight," and millions of Americans crossed a line without gaining a pound.
A genealogical reading notices several things. The category grew from population statistics, the toolkit of biopower. It created a norm that insurers, doctors, schools and individuals now use to judge bodies, including their own. None of this shows that excess weight carries no health risk; that is a question for evidence. What genealogy shows is that the line and its moral weight were made, so it is fair to ask who drew it, with what data, and for whose benefit.
