When Lázaro Cárdenas took office in December 1934, most observers expected him to be one more president obeying Calles. He was a general from Michoacán who had fought in the revolution since 1913, when he was eighteen, and had served as governor of his home state. Within eighteen months he had sent Calles into exile, and within six years he had carried out more of the constitution's promises than all of his predecessors together. For many Mexicans his presidency is the moment when the revolution finally reached them.
Breaking with Calles
Cárdenas campaigned in 1934 as if he needed votes, traveling thousands of kilometers to villages no presidential candidate had visited. As president he backed striking workers, which angered Calles, who publicly criticized the wave of strikes. Cárdenas responded by removing Calles's allies from the cabinet and the army. In April 1936 he had Calles put on a plane to the United States. Notably, he did not have him killed. After decades in which defeated leaders were usually shot, exile was itself a sign of change.
Land reform at last
Cárdenas distributed land on a scale never seen before: about eighteen million hectares, more than all previous presidents combined. Most of it went to ejidos. An ejido was land granted to a community, whose families farmed it but could not sell it. In 1936 he broke up the great cotton estates of La Laguna, in the north, and turned them into collective ejidos, and in 1937 he did the same with the henequen plantations of Yucatán, where Yaqui deportees had once labored. By the end of his term, on common estimates, ejidos held about half of Mexico's cultivated land.
Critics argued that the ejidos were often too small, short of credit and water, and less productive than private farms. Because the land could not be sold or mortgaged, and because the government controlled credit, ejido farmers also became politically dependent on officials. Supporters replied that the reform broke the power of the hacienda, gave millions of people security and dignity, and ended the conditions that had driven them to war.
Workers and the party
In 1936 a new labor federation, the Confederation of Mexican Workers, the CTM, was founded under Vicente Lombardo Toledano, a Marxist intellectual. In 1937 the government nationalized the railways and later handed their management to the railway workers' union. In 1938 Cárdenas remade the ruling party as the Party of the Mexican Revolution. The new party was organized in four sectors: labor, peasant, military and popular. Each sector brought its organized members into the party, which gave workers and peasants a real voice but also tied their organizations to the state. The military sector was dropped in 1940, and in 1946 the party took the name it would keep, the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI.
The oil expropriation
The greatest confrontation came over oil. In 1937 oil workers struck for higher wages and benefits. A federal labor board ruled in their favor, and in March 1938 the foreign oil companies refused to comply even after the Supreme Court upheld the ruling. On 18 March Cárdenas announced the expropriation of their properties, and in June a state company, Petróleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, was created to run them. Crowds rallied in support, and people lined up to donate money, jewelry and even chickens toward compensation. Britain broke off diplomatic relations. The United States, under Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy, protested but did not intervene, and an agreement in the early 1940s settled compensation for American firms.
In 1940 Cárdenas chose a moderate successor, Manuel Ávila Camacho, over more radical candidates such as Múgica. The election was marred by violence and widely believed fraud, and the revolution turned toward stability, industry and compromise.
Worked example: was it a revolution?
Historians have argued about what the revolution really was. In the 1920s and 1930s the American writer Frank Tannenbaum described a great agrarian uprising of the rural poor that remade Mexico from below. From the late 1960s, revisionist historians answered that it was mainly a struggle among elites, ending in a stronger and more centralized state; some called it a great rebellion rather than a revolution. In 1986 the British historian Alan Knight argued in a two volume study that it was a genuine popular revolution, even if the state that emerged from it served many interests besides the people who fought.
Test the question against evidence from this whole period. The old landowning class lost its estates, its army and its political power; that is real change. Millions of peasants received land, and labor rights entered the constitution. Yet the new state became an authoritarian one party system, and later governments would use the revolution's name to justify repression. Both views hold part of the truth. A revolution can genuinely transfer power and dignity to people who were treated as obstacles, and also create a new elite that speaks in their name. The wise student keeps both facts in view. So, in their way, did the rebels in Chiapas who rose in 1994 under the name of Zapata, demanding that the revolution's old promises finally be kept.
