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Every night you lose something, and every morning it comes back. In dreamless sleep, under general anesthesia or after a hard blow to the head, the lights go out: nothing is experienced at all. When you wake, colors, sounds, aches and thoughts return. That difference between the lights being on and the lights being off is the subject here. It is the most familiar thing in your life and one of the hardest to explain.

Several meanings of one word

The word conscious does many jobs, and confusion starts when they are mixed up. Sometimes it describes a whole creature: a patient is conscious when awake and responsive, as opposed to asleep or in a coma. Philosophers call this creature consciousness. Sometimes it describes a single mental state: your awareness of the hum of a fridge is conscious, while the way your brain adjusts your posture usually is not. This is state consciousness. And sometimes the word means being aware of yourself as yourself, which is called self-consciousness.

Phenomenal consciousness

The meaning that puzzles philosophers most is phenomenal consciousness: the felt quality of experience, the way things seem from the inside. Tasting coffee, hearing a cello, feeling a headache: each has a particular character for the one who undergoes it. A being is phenomenally conscious if there is some way things feel for it, some inner point of view. A thermostat responds to temperature, but almost nobody thinks it feels warm or cold.

The felt qualities of experience, such as the redness of a ripe tomato or the sting of a burn, are often called qualia (singular quale). The American philosopher C. I. Lewis gave the word its modern sense in his 1929 book Mind and the World Order.

Nagel and the bat

In 1974 the American philosopher Thomas Nagel published an essay called "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" He chose bats because they find their way mostly by echolocation, sending out high-pitched calls and reading the echoes. Scientists can describe the physics of the calls and the brain areas that process the echoes. Yet Nagel argued that even a complete description of this kind would leave something out: how echolocating feels to the bat. His wider point was that experience is tied to a subjective point of view, which an objective, third-person description cannot capture. Science usually advances by moving away from any particular viewpoint. Consciousness seems to be the one thing that consists of a viewpoint.

Nagel did not conclude that bats lack experience, or that the mind is not physical. He concluded that we do not yet have the concepts to understand how a subjective viewpoint could be a physical process, and that this should humble anyone who thinks the puzzle is already solved.

Access consciousness

In 1995 the American philosopher Ned Block drew a further line. Besides phenomenal consciousness there is access consciousness: information that is available for reasoning, for speech and for guiding action. When you see a red light and brake, the information "red light" is accessed by the parts of your mind that plan and act. Block argued that phenomenal and access consciousness are different concepts, and might come apart. You might experience more than you can report, for example the whole cluttered scene of a busy street, while only a few items are available to thought and speech. Critics reply that the two always travel together in practice, and that talk of experience beyond access cannot be tested.

Why it matters

Consciousness is not only a scientific curiosity. It seems to mark the difference between someone and something. Pleasure and suffering happen only to beings with experience. A rock can be broken but not harmed in the way a person can, because nothing is going on for the rock. This is why questions about who is conscious, whether a patient in a hospital bed, an octopus or a computer program, quickly become questions about how we ought to treat them. The idea that every person has equal worth rests partly on the fact that each person is a center of experience, a life lived from the inside.

Worked example: the drive you do not remember

You drive home on a familiar road and pull into your street with a start: you cannot recall the last twenty minutes. You stopped at red lights, kept to your lane and avoided a cyclist. Were you conscious of the road?

The distinctions help. As a creature you were plainly conscious: awake and responsive. Information about the lights was accessed, because it guided your foot to the brake. What is unclear is whether there was phenomenal experience of the road that simply was not stored in memory, or whether the driving ran without any experience at all. People disagree, and both answers have defenders. Notice that memory and consciousness are not the same thing: failing to remember an experience does not prove it never happened.

The case also shows why the subject is hard to study. The only evidence most of us have about experience comes from what people say, and here the person cannot say.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. What did C. I. Lewis do for the word qualia in 1929?
2. Why did Nagel choose bats for his 1974 essay?
3. What was Nagel's wider point about experience?
4. What is phenomenal consciousness?
5. What is access consciousness, in Ned Block's sense?
6. What did Block argue about phenomenal and access consciousness?
7. What do philosophers mean by creature consciousness?
8. According to this level, what does consciousness seem to mark?

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