By 1978 apartheid faced pressures its founders had not foreseen. The economy needed skilled Black workers that Bantu Education had not trained, Portuguese rule had collapsed in neighboring Mozambique and Angola in 1975, and the townships were restless after Soweto. The new prime minister, P. W. Botha, a former defence minister, warned white South Africans that they had to change or face destruction. What followed was a decade of reform and repression at the same time.
Total strategy and reform
Botha argued that South Africa faced a total onslaught directed from Moscow, through the ANC and neighboring states, and needed a total strategy in response. Security chiefs gained great influence, the army raided ANC bases in neighboring countries, and South Africa backed rebel movements in Mozambique and Angola. At home, Botha relaxed parts of apartheid that business found costly. After the Wiehahn Commission, Black trade unions were legally recognized in 1979. The laws against mixed marriage and sex across the color line were repealed in 1985, and in 1986 the pass laws were abolished.
The centerpiece was a new constitution in 1983 that created a tricameral parliament with separate chambers for whites, Coloureds and Indians, and none for Africans. Africans were to exercise political rights through the homelands and township councils. Botha became an executive state president with wide powers. Most Coloured and Indian voters stayed away from the elections for the new chambers.
Botha also tried to split the movement's leadership. In 1985 he offered to free Mandela if he would renounce violence. Mandela refused in a statement read by his daughter Zindzi at a rally in Soweto, arguing that a prisoner could not bargain while his organization stayed banned and his people unfree.
Revolt in the townships
Opponents organized against the new constitution. In August 1983 the United Democratic Front was launched as a coalition of hundreds of organizations: civic associations, churches, student and youth groups and unions, most of them loyal to the Freedom Charter. In 1985 COSATU was founded as a federation of trade unions, with several hundred thousand members, and combined workplace strength with political demands. From September 1984 townships in the Vaal region and then across the country rose in rent boycotts, school boycotts, consumer boycotts and street battles. The ANC in exile called on people to make the country ungovernable.
The violence ran in several directions. Police and soldiers occupied townships, and a state of emergency, partial in 1985 and national in 1986, allowed tens of thousands of detentions, many of them children. Township councillors and suspected informers were attacked, some killed by "necklacing" with burning tires, a practice some activists defended at the time and others condemned. ANC bombs killed civilians, and fighting between supporters of the UDF and of Buthelezi's Inkatha movement cost thousands of lives in Natal.
Sanctions and their critics
Pressure from abroad grew with the revolt. Sports and cultural boycotts had isolated the country for years. Student campaigns pushed universities and cities to sell shares in companies doing business in South Africa. In 1985 foreign banks refused to renew South Africa's short-term loans, forcing a freeze on debt repayments. In 1986 the US Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act over President Reagan's veto, banning new investment and many imports, and the European Community adopted narrower measures.
The case for sanctions was that they raised the cost of apartheid and told white South Africans that their country had no future as it was. Reagan and Britain's Margaret Thatcher preferred engagement, and critics argued that sanctions would hurt Black workers most, a view shared by Buthelezi. Historians still debate how much they mattered. Trade bans were often evaded; the refusal of banks to lend may have weighed more, together with the township revolt and the end of the Cold War.
Worked example: the Rubicon speech
In August 1985 the government let it be known that Botha would make a major speech in Durban. Foreign diplomats and journalists expected bold reforms, perhaps even Mandela's release. Instead, on 15 August, Botha delivered a defiant address, warning foreigners not to push South Africa around and offering little new. Because he had spoken of crossing the Rubicon, it became known as the Rubicon speech.
The financial reaction was swift. Chase Manhattan Bank had already decided in late July to stop rolling over its loans, and after the speech other banks followed. The rand fell sharply, the government closed the foreign exchange market, and on 1 September it froze repayment of much of its foreign debt. Within weeks a group of leading white businessmen flew to Zambia to meet the exiled ANC. The case shows that pressure does not come only from governments. Private lenders, reading a political signal, judged the country a bad risk, and the people who had prospered under apartheid began to look for a way out of it.
