Two frontiers test every theory in this field. One lies outside human control: the vast suffering of wild animals. The other lies inside human institutions: whether the law can treat an animal as a person rather than a thing.
The scale of the wild
Almost all animals are wild, and most belong to species that produce huge numbers of offspring. A single cod can release millions of eggs in a season, and on average only enough survive to replace the parents. The philosopher Oscar Horta and others have argued that this means most wild animals die young, soon after they come into existence, from starvation, cold, disease or being eaten. If their suffering matters as much as anyone's, nature itself may contain more suffering than all human practices combined. The picture of the wild as a place of harmony, they argue, is drawn from the few animals that survive to adulthood.
What follows is disputed. In a 2010 newspaper essay the philosopher Jeff McMahan suggested that, if it could ever be done safely, gradually reducing predation might be a good thing. Many readers were outraged, and critics offered three main replies. First, meddling in ecosystems could cause more harm than it prevents, since we understand them poorly. Second, wild animals live in communities of their own, and as Donaldson and Kymlicka argue, deserve something like sovereignty. Third, on relational views like Palmer's, we lack the special duties to wild animals that we have to animals we made dependent. Regan's view adds that predators violate no rights.
Defenders of intervention reply that humans already intervene constantly, usually for human ends, and could do so for animals' sake where we understand the effects. They point to vaccine baits dropped for foxes, which eliminated rabies from much of western Europe after field trials began in Switzerland in 1978. Wildlife contraception and rescues after oil spills are other examples. Nussbaum, too, accepts some careful intervention to protect wild animals' capabilities. Even sympathetic critics stress the difference between modest help, such as rescuing animals caught in disasters that humans caused, and grand plans to redesign ecosystems, which almost no one thinks we understand well enough to attempt.
Persons and things
In law, a person is not the same as a human being. A legal person is an entity that the law treats as holding rights and duties of its own. Companies are legal persons, and some legal systems have granted personhood to rivers. Animals, in most countries, remain property, protected by cruelty laws but without rights they can claim in court.
The idea is less strange than it sounds. Legal personhood is a tool: it lets the law recognize that some entity has interests a court should hear, and it lets someone bring a case on that entity's behalf. Defenders of animal personhood say that is exactly what animals lack. Critics reply that personhood would bring duties animals cannot bear, and that stronger welfare laws, properly enforced, could protect animals without redefining the basic categories of law.
The Nonhuman Rights Project, founded by the lawyer Steven Wise, has since 2013 used the old writ of habeas corpus, which lets a court ask whether someone is being held lawfully, on behalf of chimpanzees and elephants. Its best known client was Happy, an Asian elephant at the Bronx Zoo who in 2006 became the first elephant shown to pass a mirror test of self-recognition. In 2022 New York's highest court ruled against her by five votes to two, holding that habeas corpus protects human liberty, so Happy could not use it. Two judges dissented, arguing that the writ had always grown to meet new cases of injustice.
Courts elsewhere have gone further. In 2016 a judge in Mendoza, Argentina, declared a chimpanzee named Cecilia a non-human legal person and ordered her moved from a zoo to a sanctuary in Brazil. In 2020 the Islamabad High Court in Pakistan ordered the release of Kaavan, an elephant kept alone for years, who was moved to Cambodia. In 2022 Ecuador's Constitutional Court, in a case about a woolly monkey named Estrellita, held that wild animals are subjects of rights under the rights of nature in Ecuador's constitution. But in the United States a federal appeals court ruled in 2018, in a case about a macaque's selfie, that animals cannot sue under the Copyright Act.
Worked example: Happy's case
Happy's case gathers many of the arguments in this field. Her lawyers stressed her abilities: self-recognition, memory and social bonds, the marks of a subject of a life. The zoo stressed her care and argued that an elephant does not belong in a courtroom. The majority worried about consequences: if an elephant could claim habeas corpus, what of dogs, farm animals, or every creature in human hands? The dissenters answered that the question was not whether Happy is human but whether her confinement was just, and that the law has often extended rights to beings once treated as property. Behind the legal technicalities lies the oldest question in animal ethics: whether an animal can be wronged, and if so, who will speak for it.
