The deepest practical question in the philosophy of race is how a just society should treat race in law and policy. Should it refuse to see race at all, or take race into account in order to undo racial injustice? Thoughtful people who share the goal of equal dignity divide sharply here.
The colorblind ideal
In 1896 the Supreme Court upheld segregated rail cars in Plessy v. Ferguson. Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented: "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Colorblind liberals take this as their creed. Colorblind liberals hold that the state should treat people as individuals, never sorting them by race. They argue that racial classification is the very tool of oppression, that it teaches citizens to see one another as members of blocs, and that any racial preference treats some person as a means to a group's ends. Yet the same dissent contains a troubling passage. Harlan's dissent also predicted that the white race would stay dominant "for all time", suggesting that legal colorblindness could sit comfortably with deep social inequality. Critics of colorblindness see in this an early warning.
The race-conscious case
Defenders of race-conscious policy argue that after centuries of law that saw race all too clearly, a sudden refusal to see it freezes existing advantages in place. In the 1978 Bakke case, Justice Harry Blackmun argued that a society cannot move past racism without first paying attention to race. The philosopher Elizabeth Anderson has made a related argument. Anderson argues that racial segregation is a main cause of persisting racial inequality, cutting people off from jobs, networks and good schools, so policies that bring groups together are justified as remedies. Others defend preferences as compensation for past wrongs, or as a way to build diverse institutions that serve everyone better.
Critics of preferences
Critics from many directions, including several Black scholars, answer with evidence and principle. The economist Thomas Sowell studied preference policies in India, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Nigeria and the United States. Sowell found that the benefits of preference programs flow mostly to the better-off members of the favored groups, that the programs spread to new groups and rarely end, and that they can deepen resentment. The writer Shelby Steele argued that preferences imply that their beneficiaries cannot compete on equal terms, attaching a stigma even to those who never needed help.
The economist Glenn Loury offers perhaps the most searching critique, from someone who has long studied racial inequality. In work with Stephen Coate in 1993, Loury showed in a model that preferences can weaken incentives to build skills, so that negative stereotypes can persist rather than fade. In The Anatomy of Racial Inequality (2002), he distinguished discrimination in formal dealings such as hiring and lending, which law can reach, from discrimination in informal social contact, such as friendships and networks, which it cannot. In recent years Loury has argued that today's racial gaps owe more to differences in development than to ongoing discrimination, and that treating every disparity as proof of bias misdirects effort away from building skills, families and communities. His critics reply that development gaps are themselves products of discrimination, past and present.
The legal story
American law moved back and forth. In Bakke, Justice Lewis Powell rejected fixed racial quotas but allowed race as one factor among many in pursuit of diversity. The Court upheld that approach in 2003 in Grutter v. Bollinger. Then, in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard (2023), the Supreme Court held that race-conscious admissions at Harvard and the University of North Carolina were unlawful. Some states, such as California, had banned preferences by ballot decades earlier, and admissions of Black and Latino students at its top campuses fell sharply afterward before partly recovering. Many reformers now propose class-based preferences, which help poor applicants of every race.
Worked example: the admissions essay
After the 2023 decision, Chief Justice John Roberts noted that nothing stops an applicant from writing about the ways race has shaped their life, whether it brought hardship, inspiration or something else, so long as the applicant is judged as an individual. Picture two applicants. One writes about organizing a school walkout after a racist incident; the other writes about caring for a younger brother while her parents worked night shifts. A colorblind reading says the college may reward courage and responsibility in both, because these are individual qualities. A race-conscious critic says the first essay may become a quiet substitute for the old policy, or that applicants will feel pressure to perform their race. A Loury-style reader asks a different question: what happened in the years before the essay, and could the college do more to develop talent early instead of sorting it at eighteen? Each reading respects the applicant as an end in herself; they differ over what that respect requires.
