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Oil did not create the modern Middle East, but it changed what states there could do and what outsiders wanted from them. In 1900 the region's governments lived on land taxes, customs and tribute. By the 1970s several of them were among the richest in the world, paid mostly by foreign buyers for a single product pumped from the ground.

Concessions and companies

The first great concession went to a British investor, William Knox D'Arcy, who in 1901 won a concession to search for oil across most of Persia for sixty years. After years of failure his drillers struck oil at Masjed Soleyman in 1908, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was founded the next year. In 1914, as the Royal Navy converted its ships from coal to oil, the British government bought a majority stake in Anglo-Persian to secure fuel for the navy. Persia received a small share of profits, and resentment over the terms grew for decades.

In Iraq a gusher at Baba Gurgur near Kirkuk in 1927 confirmed huge reserves. The partners in what became the Iraq Petroleum Company, British, French, Dutch and American firms, signed the Red Line Agreement in 1928, in which they agreed not to seek oil concessions on their own inside the old Ottoman lands but only together. In Saudi Arabia the king, short of money as pilgrim revenue fell in the Depression, granted a concession in 1933 to Standard Oil of California, which struck commercial quantities at Dammam in 1938. Its local company became the Arabian American Oil Company, or Aramco.

From concessions to control

After the Second World War producing governments pressed for better terms. In 1950 Aramco agreed to split its profits roughly fifty-fifty with the Saudi government, following a model pioneered in Venezuela, and the formula spread quickly. Iran went further, nationalizing its oil industry in 1951, a move that ended in a foreign-backed coup two years later. In 1960 producers founded OPEC to coordinate. During the 1970s producing states took majority stakes or full ownership of the companies operating on their soil; the Saudi government had bought out Aramco entirely by 1980.

The decisive shock came in October 1973. During the war between Israel and Egypt and Syria, the Arab members of OPEC, organized as OAPEC, cut production and embargoed shipments to the United States and the Netherlands. Prices soared. For the first time producers rather than Western companies set the price of oil, and the money that flowed into Gulf treasuries transformed cities, armies and ambitions.

The rentier state

Scholars have tried to explain what this money did to politics. The Iranian economist Hossein Mahdavy in 1970, and later Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, described the rentier state: a state that lives mainly on external rents such as oil sales rather than on taxing its own citizens. Such a state can buy loyalty with jobs, subsidies and services, and it need not bargain with taxpayers. The old democratic slogan "no taxation without representation" runs in reverse: if there is little taxation, citizens may have less leverage to demand representation. The political scientist Michael Ross, in The Oil Curse (2012), argued from worldwide data that oil wealth makes democratic transitions less likely and has tended to keep women out of paid work and public life in oil states, since oil booms favor sectors that historically employed men.

Critics reply that oil is not destiny. Norway found oil and remained a democracy, and oil states differ greatly in how they are governed. Much depends on what institutions existed before the oil arrived, how the money is managed, and whether the state also taxes. Others note that many poor non-oil states in the region were also authoritarian, so oil cannot be the only cause. A fair conclusion is that oil wealth gives rulers powerful tools, but people and institutions decide how those tools are used.

Worked example: Kuwait's parliament

Kuwait seems at first to fit the rentier model perfectly. Oil revenues pay for most of the state budget, citizens pay no income tax, and most Kuwaiti nationals work for the government. Yet in 1962, shortly after independence, Kuwait adopted a constitution creating an elected National Assembly with real powers to question ministers and block laws. For decades it was the most assertive parliament in the Gulf. Rulers suspended it in 1976 and again in 1986, but public pressure restored it each time, and women won the right to vote and run for office in 2005.

Kuwait also shows the model's warning. Deputies and ministers deadlocked repeatedly over spending and reform, governments resigned again and again, and in May 2024 the emir suspended parliament and parts of the constitution for up to four years, citing gridlock. Apply the ideas: oil money made generous welfare possible and let rulers rely less on consent, but a pre-existing tradition of merchant families negotiating with the ruling family, and a written constitution, gave citizens a voice the model alone would not predict. Rents shape politics; they do not settle it.

Quiz

5 questions · Practice: scored, not saved

1. Who won a concession in 1901 to search for oil across most of Persia?
2. Why did the British government buy a majority stake in Anglo-Persian in 1914?
3. What did partners in the Red Line Agreement of 1928 promise?
4. Which company won the Saudi oil concession in 1933?
5. What did Aramco agree with the Saudi government in 1950?
6. Who imposed the oil embargo of October 1973?
7. What is a rentier state?
8. What did Michael Ross argue in The Oil Curse?

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