Around the tip of Africa
By the 1480s King João II of Portugal had a clear aim: reach India by sea. In 1488 Bartolomeu Dias rounded the southern tip of Africa and proved that the Atlantic and Indian Oceans were joined. His crew, worn out, forced him to turn back. Tradition says Dias called the headland the Cape of Storms and the king renamed it the Cape of Good Hope, for the promise it held. Around the same time the king sent a spy, Pêro da Covilhã, overland through Egypt and the Red Sea. He reached India's Malabar coast and the Swahili ports, gathering the kind of intelligence that no ship could.
Vasco da Gama
Ten years later Vasco da Gama left Lisbon in July 1497 with four ships. Rather than hugging the African coast, he swung far out into the South Atlantic, spending more than three months out of sight of land, one of the longest open sea passages any European crew had made. He rounded the Cape, worked up the East African coast and met a mixed welcome. At Mombasa he was received with hostility. At Malindi the ruler, a rival of Mombasa, supplied a pilot who knew the route across the ocean to India. The pilot's identity is uncertain. A famous Arab navigator, Ahmad ibn Majid, was once named, but most historians now think this is unlikely.
Gama reached the region of Calicut in May 1498. The ruler, known to Europeans as the Zamorin, ran a wealthy port used to merchants from everywhere. The gifts Gama offered, such as cloth, hats, coral and washbasins, struck the Calicut court as too poor for a king, and Muslim merchants already trading there saw the newcomers as rivals. Gama loaded pepper and spices anyway and sailed home. Many of his men died of scurvy on the return. Estimates vary, but perhaps a third to a half of the crew survived. The cargo still paid for the voyage many times over.
Force at sea
Portugal had little that Asian buyers wanted. What it did have was ships armed with heavy guns. The voyages that followed turned trade into war. On his second voyage, in 1502, Gama captured a ship carrying Muslim pilgrims home from Mecca and burned it with many passengers aboard. Calicut was bombarded more than once. The aim was not to conquer large territories but to control sea lanes.
The architect of that plan was Afonso de Albuquerque, governor from 1509 to 1515. His strategy was to seize a few key ports that commanded the ocean's choke points. Albuquerque took Goa in 1510, Melaka in 1511 and Hormuz in 1515, but failed to take Aden at the mouth of the Red Sea. Goa became the capital of what the Portuguese called the Estado da Índia, the State of India: a network of forts and trading posts stretching from Mozambique to Macau rather than a land empire.
Selling the sea
To profit from ships they did not own, the Portuguese introduced the cartaz, a pass that Asian merchant ships were required to buy from the Portuguese. A ship without one could be seized. Ships with a pass were often required to stop at a Portuguese fort and pay duties there. This was a new idea in the Indian Ocean, where no power had claimed the right to license all shipping.
It never fully worked. Portugal had only a few thousand men in Asia at any time, and many of them traded privately. Asian merchants dodged patrols, used other routes or paid bribes, and by the mid sixteenth century much of the spice trade through the Red Sea to the Mediterranean had recovered. Portugal skimmed a large share of Asian trade without ever controlling it.
Brazil by the way
The second fleet to India, under Pedro Álvares Cabral, swung so far west in 1500 that it reached the coast of Brazil. Cabral claimed the land and sailed on to India. Whether the landfall was an accident or a quiet test of what lay west is still debated. Either way, Portugal now had a foothold in the Americas, though for decades it valued Brazil mainly for a red dyewood.
Worked example: a Gujarati merchant in 1520
Imagine a merchant in Cambay, in Gujarat, preparing a ship of cotton cloth bound for Melaka. A generation earlier he would have paid customs at each port and taken his chances with weather and pirates. Now he must think about the Portuguese.
He can buy a cartaz. That gives him protection from Portuguese patrols, but it forbids him to carry certain goods, such as pepper and weapons, and it obliges him to call at a Portuguese fort and pay duty. Or he can sail without a pass and hope to avoid their ships, which is risky but cheaper if it works. Or he can partner with a Portuguese private trader who will carry the goods under his own name.
Many merchants mixed all three. The example shows why the Portuguese system is best understood as a protection racket at sea, backed by guns, layered on top of an Asian trade that kept most of its own merchants, routes and rules. It also shows how a weak but armed newcomer could take a cut of a rich system without replacing it.
