Once the break with the United States was complete, Cuba's leaders had to decide what kind of socialism to build. Their first answers were bold and idealistic, their later ones more cautious and Soviet. Both left a record of real social achievements alongside a closed political system, and both deserve a fair hearing.
The New Man
Che Guevara, as minister of industry, argued that socialism required a change in people, not only in property. Guevara's New Man would work for the common good, not for money, moved by moral incentives such as honor, medals and voluntary labor rather than bonuses. In a famous essay of 1965 he described a society in which work would become a social duty freely embraced. Other planners, closer to Soviet practice, favored wage differences and enterprise accounts. Guevara left Cuba in 1965 to fight in the Congo and then in Bolivia, where he was captured and killed in October 1967.
The great harvest
The idealistic years peaked in two campaigns. In 1968 the Revolutionary Offensive took over most remaining small businesses, tens of thousands of them, down to street vendors, bars and repair shops. Then Castro staked the country's prestige on a harvest of ten million tons of sugar in 1970, far above any previous crop. Workers, soldiers and students were sent to the cane fields, and other industries were starved of labor and fuel. The harvest fell short at about 8.5 million tons, still a record, and the disruption damaged the rest of the economy.
The Soviet model
After 1970 Cuba moved closer to Soviet methods. In 1972 Cuba joined COMECON, the Soviet trade bloc, and planners introduced Soviet style targets and accounting. A new constitution, approved by referendum in 1976, declared the Communist Party the leading force of society and created assemblies called People's Power, elected locally from candidates screened by the system. The Soviet Union bought Cuban sugar above world prices and sold oil below them; by many estimates the support was worth several billion dollars a year by the 1980s, though such figures are hard to pin down.
Social gains
The revolution's defenders point to what this support helped pay for. Education and health care were free and reached the countryside for the first time. From 1984 a program that placed a family doctor and nurse in neighborhoods gave Cuba official health statistics close to those of rich countries. Legal racial discrimination ended. The Federation of Cuban Women, led by Vilma Espín, drew women into paid work and schooling, and the Family Code of 1975 required spouses to share housework and child care equally, at least on paper. Critics accept many of these gains while noting that official data could not be checked by independent researchers, and that Black Cubans remained scarce in the top leadership.
Limits on freedom
There was no independent press, no right to form parties or unions, and no legal way to campaign against the government. Thousands of political prisoners served long sentences in the 1960s. From 1965 to 1968 the UMAP camps were forced labor units for those deemed unreliable: gay men, religious believers such as Jehovah's Witnesses, and young people judged insufficiently revolutionary were sent to work in the fields under military discipline. Decades later Castro accepted responsibility for this persecution. In 1971 the poet Heberto Padilla was jailed and made to confess his supposed errors in public; many foreign writers who had supported the revolution broke with it in protest.
Cuba abroad
In 1975 Cuban troops went to Angola to defend its new government against forces backed by South Africa, and by 1988 some fifty thousand were there. The settlement of 1988 linked their withdrawal to Namibia's independence, and Nelson Mandela later thanked Cuba for its role against apartheid. Critics stress the cost in Cuban lives and the service these wars gave to Soviet strategy.
At home, discontent surfaced in 1980. After guards were withdrawn, thousands crowded into the Peruvian embassy seeking asylum, and the government then opened the port of Mariel to anyone with a boat to collect them. About 125,000 Cubans left in six months, while the government called them scum, added some prisoners to the boats and organized crowds to harass those departing.
Worked example: planning by a single number
The ten million ton harvest offers a case study in decision making. The target was chosen for political reasons, to prove that the revolution could achieve the impossible and to pay debts to Moscow. Once announced, it became a test of loyalty. Managers who doubted it had every reason to stay silent, and there was no free press, independent union or opposition party to raise the alarm.
A fair analysis notes that betting on sugar was not irrational, since Cuba had the land and the skills and the Soviet market paid well. Market economies also make costly mistakes, from speculative bubbles to failed megaprojects. The difference lies in correction. Where prices, journalists and voters can signal trouble, errors tend to be caught sooner. Where a single number stands for loyalty and criticism looks like disloyalty, errors grow until they cannot be hidden. The lesson applies well beyond Cuba: any organization that punishes bad news will receive less of it, and will learn the truth late.
