Loneliness is felt by individuals, but some of its causes lie in how communities are organized. For much of the past two centuries, ordinary people in many democracies built their social lives around voluntary groups. In many places those groups have thinned out, and the question of why, and what has replaced them, is one of the liveliest debates in social science.
A nation of joiners
Visiting the United States in the 1830s, the French writer Alexis de Tocqueville was struck by how readily its citizens organized. In Henry Reeve's translation he wrote that "Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form associations." Over the following century this habit produced a dense web of lodges, granges, women's clubs, veterans' groups, choirs and parent associations. Before governments offered much insurance, fraternal orders such as the Odd Fellows provided members with sickness and burial benefits, paid for by dues and run by the members themselves.
Putnam's accounting
The political scientist Robert Putnam's Bowling Alone (2000) assembled evidence that from the 1960s onward Americans joined fewer groups, attended fewer meetings, entertained friends at home less often and even played cards together less. More interesting than the trend was his attempt to explain it. Putnam offered rough estimates of how much each cause contributed. He attributed roughly half the decline to generational change: a "long civic generation," born roughly from 1910 to 1940 and shaped by depression and war, was being replaced by successors who joined less at every age. He blamed television for perhaps a quarter, and pressures of time and money and suburban sprawl for about a tenth each. On sprawl, he estimated that each extra ten minutes of daily commuting cut involvement in community affairs by about 10 percent.
From membership to management
The political scientist Theda Skocpol, in Diminished Democracy (2003), noticed a change in the kind of organization, not just the number. Great American associations of the past were federated: a national body with state branches and thousands of local chapters where members met in person. During the late twentieth century, chapter-based membership groups gave way to professionally run advocacy organizations whose members mostly send checks. These new groups could be effective at lobbying, but their members rarely met one another.
Skocpol argued this mattered because local chapters taught members to run meetings, keep accounts and hold elections. A farmer or factory worker might serve as a chapter officer and learn how self-government works. The old groups also often mixed social classes.
Faith communities
Religious congregations have long been the largest source of associational life in the United States, accounting by Putnam's estimate for about half of all memberships and a large share of volunteering. Gallup has asked Americans about church, synagogue or mosque membership since the 1930s. For decades the figure hovered around 70 percent. In 2020 it fell below half for the first time, to 47 percent. Similar declines have occurred across much of Europe and in other wealthy countries, and congregations have often been replaced by nothing that plays the same social role.
The case for skepticism
Critics have challenged parts of this story. Some argue that people did not stop associating so much as change how: youth sports leagues, support groups, book clubs and later online communities grew while lodges shrank. Others point out that many mid-century associations excluded Black Americans, women, Jews or immigrants, so nostalgia for them can overlook who was shut out. Skocpol herself stressed that the change was driven partly by elites and new funding models, not by ordinary people simply losing interest.
In The Upswing (2020), Putnam and Shaylyn Romney Garrett placed the decline in a longer frame. Using measures of economics, politics, social life and culture, they traced what they called an "I-we-I" curve: a rise in shared commitment from about 1900 that peaked in the mid 1960s, followed by a turn back toward individualism. Their message was partly hopeful: Americans had climbed out of a selfish, divided era once before, during the Progressive Era, through deliberate civic effort.
Worked example: Lodge No. 212
Picture a lodge in a small Ohio town, founded in 1888. By 1925 it has 400 members: shopkeepers, railroad workers, a doctor and farmers. Members pay dues that fund a sick benefit and a funeral fund. They elect officers every year, debate the budget and run a summer picnic for the whole town.
By 1970 membership has slipped to 250, mostly older men. Younger families have moved to a new suburb, and many husbands commute to a city an hour away. Television fills the evenings that meetings once did. Health insurance now comes through employers, so the sick benefit no longer matters.
By 2020 the lodge has 30 members and sells its building. Some of its old roles have moved elsewhere: a national charity runs fundraising by mail, a youth soccer league fills Saturday mornings, and residents keep in touch through a neighborhood forum online. Each of the forces Putnam named is present here, along with Skocpol's shift from local chapters to distant organizations. Whether the town has lost something it needs, or simply changed its forms, depends on whether those newer ties teach the same skills and bring the same people together.
